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I. INTRODUCTION. 
On the morning of 11 November 1918 a cease-fire was 
sounded along the western front of Germany, signaling the end 
of the First World War, some four and a half years of the most 
devastating organized violence the modern world had ever 
known. The physical and material destruction wrought by the 
war was unprecedented and nothing short of catastrophic: Its 
casualty list may ultimately have included some sixty million 
civilians and combatants and the total bill, combining direct 
and indirect costs, exceeded three hundred billion dollars. 
In those regions of Europe where combat had concentrated most 
severely, hundreds of thousands of homes had been smashed to 
the ground; roads, railways and lines of communication were 
destroyed beyond repair; entire forests had been laid to the 
ground; and vast tracts of land were rendered unfit for either 
agricultural or industrial use.1 In addition, four ruling 
~ynasties which, for centuries, had exercised authority over a 
large percentage of the world's population- Romanov Russia, 
Hohenzollern Germany, Habsburg Austria-Hungary and Ottoman 
Turkey- had all ceased to exist. Carved from the remains of 
these fallen giants were a host of "successor states," some of 
whose very existence has continued to confound European 
affairs for the better part of the twentieth century. 
Following immediately on the heels of the war, and adding to 
what already seemed an endless list of woes, a deadly 
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inf 1 uenza virus swept across the world and carried away more 
of Europe 1 s population than had all of the war 1 s battles 
combined. To anyone gazing upon the battlefields and 
trench-lines stretching from the North Sea to the northern 
Swiss border during the winter of 19181 visions of Armageddon 
might not have been out of reach. 
The task of rebuilding the European continent out of the 
rubble of the Great War fell to those statesmen who gathered 
in the city of Paris in January 1919 so that peace and order 
might once again reign in Europe. Representatives of the 
twenty-seven victorious states met to chart the course of the 
future. Their mandate was twofold: to mend the political 1 
economic and social components of the international system of 
order which the war had ravaged and to ensure that such a 
"collapse of 
task if ever 
counts. The 
civilization" might never again occur; a daunting 
there was one. Sadly 1 they failed on both 
Peace of Paris (as the six months of 
international negotiation in the suburbs of that city came to 
be called) proved itself inadequate in laying the foundations 
for a stable system of international order as had existed 
before the outbreak of war in 1914. Regarding the failure of 
the Peace to prevent a second outbreak of total war 1 the 
observer has only to look to the year 1939 to witness that 
frightening turn of events. 
It is the inability of the Peace of Paris to reestablish 
European political and economic stability 1 rather than its 
failure to prevent the outbreak of a Second World War I that we 
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are to be concerned with here. European political and 
financial relations throughout the period 1919-1925 gave ample 
enough evidence that something had not gone entirely correct 
during the deliberations in Paris: For the better part of 
those years with which we are concerned, the European states 
had not settled themselves into a new era of lasting peace, 
while tensions between them, rather than abating, appeared to 
be on the rise. This situation was particularly evident in 
the case of three of the Great Powers left standing, if only 
barely, at war's end- Great Britain, France and Germany. The 
military alliance 
France throughout 
which had existed between Great Britain and 
the war years, given their historical 
animosity to each other, had never been an easy one; the 
proceedings in Paris were to demonstrate just how rocky that 
relationship was; . and by 1923, the so-called Entente Cordi ale 
was all but dead. While both these states pursued the same 
goal during the war, namely, the defeat of the German Empire, 
they did not appear to share the same interests once that feat 
had been accomplished. Germany, for her part, refused to 
acknowledge the loss of the war and with it her new-found role 
as a vanquished power and, until 1925, she had no intention of 
adding anything constructive to a system which saw her as 
such. The clash between the national interests of these three 
states, at least until 1924, 
reestablishing Great Power harmony 
the post-war pursuits of these 
irreconcilable, we should focus 
precluded any hope 
in Europe. To clarify 
three states appeared 
on the tension between 
of 
why 
so 
the 
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national interests of the three powers and the treaty signed 
on 28 June 1919 which brought the war between the European 
Allies and Germany to an end- the Treaty of Versailles. 
Great Britain came to the Paris Peace Conference having 
already settled several issues regarding Germany which had 
been a threat to her national interests; three of these 
concerns in particular were allayed with minimal wrangling. 
The German navy, which for a decade or so prior to the war had 
posed a growing threat to Britannia's rule over the waves and 
her "lifeline" (the sea lanes linking Britain with her 
overseas Dominions) to the Empire, "\vas no longer 
anybody, least of all to the British Admiralty. 
Germany's overseas territories in Africa and in 
a menace to 
Secondly, 
the Pacific 
were now in the hands of the recently established League of 
Nations in the form of "Mandates". . Several of these Mandates 
were placed under British authority, increasing Britain's 
already 
Finally, 
substantial 
the German 
holdings in 
bid for 
the world 
domination 
outside 
of the 
Europe. 
European 
continent had - collapsed and, if the French could be held in 
check, it looked as if the continental balance of power might 
once again reach a state of equilibrium, which was precisely 
where the British liked it. 
With these aces up her sleeve, Britain was afforded two 
advantages which her continental counterparts could never hope 
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to achieve. The first was Britain's chance to return to the 
long-cherished policy of "splendid isolation" due to the 
geographical good fortune of having an island home with water 
separating herself from her neighbors. From this high point, 
the British would hold themselves in reserve as a deus ex 
machina, ready to act once again whenever the balance of power 
once more appeared threatened. A return to this policy, 
however, was sure to arouse bitter resentment from the French, 
who were not prepared to watch the British shake the dust of 
France off their 
intact) Germany 
boots while 
continued to 
a vanquished (but structurally 
remain a plausible threat to 
French territorial security. 
There was a second advantage, one far more crucial where 
post-war Anglo-French relations were concerned, 
the British during the proceedings at Paris. 
so much already, they could afford to seek 
bestowed upon 
Having gained 
more lenient 
terms for Germany than could the French. In doing so, they 
hoped to forestall the rise of a vengeful Germany who at some 
time in the future could come and demand retribution. More 
importantly, however, strong views had arisen within the 
British camp which argued that Germany must remain 
economically viable in order to serve as an extremely valuable 
and integral continental trading partner. British financial 
experts, amongst whom the voice of economist John Maynard 
Keynes (whom we shall discuss at greater length) may have been 
the most influential, predicted that the future of a 
financially strong Britain must be tied to a Germany capable 
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of buying British manufactured products. 
implied a 
This desire for 
certain degree of future German economic prosperity 
leniency for the defeated power at the peace talks. Leniency 
was not what the French had in mind, however, and this was to 
become a bitter point between the governments in London and 
Paris during the Conference and for some time after. 
The French, who had suffered so much devastation on their 
soil during the war, were unable to count blessings as had the 
British. There was no body of water separating France and 
Germany save a bit of the Rhine, and that just was not wide 
enough so far as the French were concerned. Twice within . a 
half-century the French had suffered an onslaught from the Hun 
across the Rhine; they were not prepared to tolerate a third. 
Thus, the French delegation at Paris had one very clear aim: 
the permanent crippling of Germany. There were those French 
officials who dreamt of turning the German clock as far · back 
as the days of the Holy Roman Empire, before Napoleon I 
disbanded that feeble organization of states in 1806 . . A 
Germany reduced to a handful of insignificant, decentralized 
principalities would never again pose any threat to French 
security. This dubious scheme, however, came into direct 
conflict with the Wilsonian principles of self-determination, 
which demanded that peoples 
be given the right to 1 i ve 
of the same culture and language 
together under a government of 
their own choosing. The British and American Allies were not 
prepared to allow such a flagrant violation of national 
integrity, and if the French delegation was going to achieve 
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any measure of success at all, they were going to have to 
compromise on certain points. Having anticipated this 
Anglo-American reaction, the French were ready with a reserve 
plan which had been developed under Marshal Foch, the Allied 
generalissimo during the war. The Foch Plan called for the 
partitioning of the Rhineland, the bit of land between the 
French frontier and the Rhine River, from the rest of Germany 
and reestablishing it as 
mi 1 i tary force ensconced 
bridgeheads on the other 
a French protectorate. A French 
in the Rhineland and occupying the 
side of the river would be able, if 
necessary, to strike rapidly at the German industrial 
heartland- the Ruhr Valley. French garrisons in the Rhineland 
would force Germany to rethink any future aggression directed 
toward France. 
The Allies were wary of this course of action; David 
Lloyd George, Prime 
in Paris, feared 
Minister and chief British representative 
the creation of another Alsace-Lorraine 
(these being the two French provinces which the Germans had 
seized from France after the Franco-Prussian War of 1871, 
causing bitter resentment amongst the French) sort · of 
situation in which the Germans were sure to want the Rhineland 
back at some time in the future. Thus, the French were forced 
to swallow a watered-down version of 
for the region. The Rhineland was to 
military occupation for fifteen years-
assumed the Germans would be a 
their original designs 
be placed under Allied 
after which it was 
more peaceful people. 
Thereafter, it was to become a permanently demi 1 i tar ized zone; 
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and a 
German 
great many restrictions 
mi 1 i tary, including the 
were to be placed upon 
limiting of the army to 
the 
one 
hundred thousand men and a prohibition 
offensive weapons. If the French 
on the manufacture 
had been forced 
of 
to 
compromise, then the Allies were disposed to grant them a 
favor for having done so. In return for French acceptance of 
the British and Americans gave a the Rhineland provisions, 
military guarantee of French security against any future 
German aggression. A formidable-sounding guarantee such as 
this was undoubtedly a victory for the French quest to feel 
secure within their own borders. 
The victory was fleeting, however, for on 19 March 1920 
the United States Senate, after a third vote on the issue, 
failed to ratify the American signature to the Treaty of 
Versailles as well as . the security pact with the French. With 
the removal of the American half of the guarantee, so went the 
British, for it had been stipulated that either both parties 
to the pact be 
This left the 
nightmares: 
present 
French to 
If the 
or it would 
deal with 
Americans 
be 
one 
and 
effected by neither. 
of their greatest 
British were slowly 
withdrawing from continental affairs, as was indeed happening, 
then the French would be left alone to face a Germany 
bristling with rage and recalling defeat at the hands of 
France. 
Left to go it alone, the French pursued two policies in 
seeking to attain their security. The first involved a 
tradi tiona! policy of finding friends on Germany's eastern 
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borders, thereby "encircling" her with French allies and 
presenting 
possibility 
Berlin with one of its own greatest nightmares: the 
of another two-front war. With the temporary 
withdrawal of Russian power from Europe, due to the Bolshevik 
Revolution of 1917, France was forced to look to those 
fledgling states which had recently sprung from the ashes of 
the fallen Central and Eastern European Empires. This policy 
involved signing military guarantees and the appropriation of 
French capital for the financial and strategic strengthening 
of France 1 s new-found allies, preferably at the expense of 
Germany. This was bound to put the French at loggerheads with 
the British, who were not ready to allow the further weakening 
of Germany, a state with whose reasonable well-being they had 
become quite concerned, to bolster a number of states in 
Eastern Europe which they did not consider to be within their 
immediate realm of interest. 
France 1 s second pol icy was a matter of economics. In 
brief, at the end of the war the Allies, including the French, 
owed large sums to the Americans (and to a lesser extent the 
British), who had funded virtually the entire Allied effort 
during the latter half of the war. The French did not have 
the money with which to pay. They also had an electorate at 
home demanding that Germany must pay something for all the 
damage she had caused. The French representatives in Paris 
therefore demanded that Germany pay a war indemnity. This was 
to include the costs of rebuilding the devastated regions in 
northeastern France, a region where much of the combat had 
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taken place, service pensions for the soldiers, and other war 
related expenses. While the figure that these represented was 
far less than the thoroughly unrealizable claim of the entire 
cost of the war, it was still a towering sum. With her share 
of the reparations, France could hope to do two things. 
First, she would use part of the money to pay off her foreign 
debt. Secondly, by assuring that Germany was saddled with a 
tremendous indemnity, she could be quite sure that Germany 
would be a financially questionable s .tate for some time to 
come. While this punitive plan may not have made good 
economic sense, it was altogether compatible with France's 
desire to keep Germany at heel. 
Here again, however, the French were tangling with the 
British, for it appeared to be in Britain's best interest to 
have an economically viable Germany, not a bankrupt one. This 
raises an interesting point regarding the British delegation 
at Paris. Lloyd George, like the French Premier Clemenceau, 
was responsible 
reparations. On 
to an electorate 
the other hand, 
clamoring 
British 
for heavy German 
financial experts 
were warning the Prime Minister that Germany must not be made 
to pay more than she was capable of. The result of this 
discrepancy between public and expert opinion was that during 
the Conference the British demanded their share of reparation 
payments. Immediately thereafter, however, they called for 
concessions to be made to Germany and throughout the first 
half of the 19-20's Britain fought France against making things 
unbearable for Germany. The struggle between a Britain 
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seeking to lighten the German load and a France looking to 
lighten the German purse opened great fissures between these 
two countries throughout the years 1919-1925. 
We are left with the national interests of the third 
European power with which we are concerned- Germany. Both the 
German people and their fledgling republican government, the 
Weimar Republic, appeared 
accept that the Empire, 
existence in the Hall of 
to be either unwilling or unable to 
which had sprung gloriously into 
Mirrors at Versailles some fifty 
years before, which had not seen a battle fought within its 
own borders or any of the war 1 s terrible devastation visited 
upon its soil, and whose armies had marched home in an orderly 
fashion, could be dead. Moreover, it seemed preposterous for 
anyone to believe that the state which had unilaterally 
dominated European affairs for half a century was now to be 
relegated to second-class status. 
was precisely what the Allies were 
people. 
Yet it appeared that this 
demanding of the German 
With the refusal to accept a role as a vanquished power 
came the German refutation of a system of international order 
that referred to her as one. In no way, or so it appeared, 
was it in Germany 1 s interests to comply with the rules of a 
system in which she 
intend on abiding 
was not to be a major player. 
by the provisions of the 
Nor did she 
Treaty of 
Versailles, 
Carthaginian, 
perpetually at 
which she perceived as being not only 
but specifically designed to keep her 
heel. In this sense, every German was now a 
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"revisionist," looking to erase a treaty that simply wasn't 
fair. 
When the argument that it was the pursuit of national 
interests which dampened the hope of European stability is 
pursued far enough, it does not necessarily follow that it 
must be true. Surely nation-states have always pursued their 
national interests and yet avoided the horrifying results of 
1914-1918. Just as surely, nation-states have always been 
able to pursue these interests within some framework of 
international stability; such a system had existed before the 
war, so why was so much difficulty encountered in creating one 
afterwards? The answer lies in the novelty of both the First 
World War and the Treaty of Versailles. To be sure, there had 
been wars of great magnitude in European history, as there 
were treaties concluding these wars as large as that signed at 
Versailles. There was never a war in European history, 
however, that exacted such an enormous toll on the human and 
material resources of the combatants. The American Civil War 
of 1861-1865 may have foreshadowed what the conduct of future 
warfare was to be like, but in no way could it have prepared 
Europe for the scope of the First World War. The Great War 
was "total" war, for not only did it include soldiers, 
generals and monarchs, but entire populations. Whole segments 
of society were touched by the war in one way or another; the 
resources of both soldiers and civilians alike were drawn upon 
to partake in the war effort- hence the term "home front." 
To clarify the novelty of the situation in 1919, we might 
focus for a moment on 
in European history 
settlement over Europe: 
The peacemakers 
convened to settle 
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the last great convention of diplomats 
who met to effect a general peace 
the Congress of Vienna of 1814-1815. 
in Vienna, as did those in Paris 
a multilateral conflict; . to legalize 
a new territorial status quo; to guard against future acts of 
aggression by the defeated power; and to ensure that the 
concert of European powers might be capable of avoiding 
another outbreak of such large-scale aggressions (in this 
case, the Napoleonic Wars). 2 In both Vienna and Paris, the 
plenipotentiaries pursued these goals while simultaneously 
striving to maximize their own national interests.3 Further, 
the representatives at both conferences arrogated to 
themselves the right to settle all territorial, economic 
and political issues before submitting them to the entire body 
of attending states.4 
The Congress was a unique body of reactionaries where the 
likes of Castlereagh and Wellington were considered liberals. 
Its framers shared a set of cardinal beliefs in the balance of 
power and in spheres of interest, in private understandings 
between sovereigns, and in the private ownership of terri tory 
by legitimate descent.S The prime purpose of Vienna had been, 
after all, to restore Europe to the system of monarchies which 
had existed before the outbreak of the French Revolution in 
1789. This system was viewed as the only legitimate framework 
within which change could or should take place. A king 
deprived of his territories in one part of Europe could be 
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"compensated" in another, irrespective of nationality, 
language or culture- a so-called "transference of souls."6 
The representatives of the Great Powers at Vienna (Britain, 
Austria, Russia, Prussia and defeated France) upheld the 
elementary distinction between themselves and the minor 
powers; decisions were taken by the Great Powers and 
subsequently passed on to the lesser European states- this was 
not an egalitarian organization. The peacemakers were also 
quite secure in having the support of powerful political 
strata at home that by this time craved nothing more than the 
return of domestic order and international stability; they 
needed to concern themselves almost solely with territorial 
re-structuring and considered themselves responsible to 
crowned sovereigns, not popular pressures.? 
The situation in Paris was quite unlike that at Vienna. 
The European political 
since that last meeting 
system of states had all 
atmosphere had changed remarkably 
of the Great Powers. The monarchical 
Austria, Russia, Prussia 
but disappeared; 
(later Germany) 
the sovereigns of 
and France had 
disappeared and Great Britain's was now but a figurehead. The 
statesmen who met in Paris were responsible to parliaments and 
to an electorate quite concerned with the outcome of the peace 
proceedings. Many of those representatives had been elected 
with the understanding that they were going to Paris to make 
the Germans pay for the unforgivable transgression they had 
committed and i t:!re not altogether willing to face the 
consequences if they did not make that so. For the most part 
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these men were not life-trained diplomats but politicians who 
depended on votes. Political and financial decisions which 
may have been judicious in the long-run were not necessarily 
politically expedient in the present; this was undoubtedly a 
factor in the decision-making processes of men who wanted to 
remain in office. 
There was another significant difference between Vienna 
and Paris, and that was an American President named Woodrow 
Wilson who came to Paris in January 1919 and set Europe on its 
ear. Wilson had come not to collect money, not for 
terri tor.ial aggrandizement, and not to punish the vanquished. 
Rather, he came to make the world safe for democracy, to 
ensure that the Great War had been the war fought to end all 
war, and to right the · wrongs of old incurred through the 
decrepit 
spoke of 
policy of 
convinced 
practices of European ~nternational politics. He 
a new, more open diplomacy to replace the outdated 
secret diplomacy and treaty-making which he was 
had led to the war; of Fourteen glorious · Points on 
which the upcoming peace should be founded; and of a League of 
Nations, a democratic congress of states (one nation, one 
vote) to replace the old balance of power, which was concerned 
primarily with only a handful of preeminent states. There was 
also talk of "national self-determination," by which peoples 
of the same nationality, culture and language would be 
entitled to their own stat~ with a government of their 
choosing- so much for the old transference of souls. The 
American president's highfalutin, and sometimes impractical, 
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principles could not be disregarded by the European statesmen, 
for not only did they engender an enormous amount of hope in 
the war-weary European peoples, but it was the Americans to 
whom Europe owed so much money; he who holds the purse, after 
all, plays the tune. Wilson's insistence on the "right" as 
opposed to the expedient, however, continued to vex affairs 
both in Paris and throughout Europe for some years to come. 
The final novelty brought into existence by the First 
World War, and what was to become the central problem of 
European international politics throughout the post-war years, 
was that of Germany- What was to be done with Germany? For 
the British, the defeat of Germany was a registered fact; she 
must now be reintegrated into the body of nations, and Europe 
must move on. For the French, so long as there was a German 
state capable of rebuilding and rearming itself, this could 
never be so. French security simply no longer appeared 
compatible with the existence of a unified Germany. Finally, 
for Germany, there should not be a system of states in which 
she was considered vanquished and second-class. Britain would 
not allow Germany to be erased from the map, France would not 
allow her to be placed back on, and Germany wanted the entire 
map redrawn. So long as these three powers insisted on 
pursuing these goals to the bitter end, any hope of 
reestablishing stable Great Power relations was dashed. 
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In subsequent pages, we shall trace the pursuit of these 
national interests through the Treaty of Versailles and the 
various Allied conferences held throughout the first half of 
the 1920's. We shall conclude with the Treaty of Locarno, by 
which it appeared as if the European Great Powers might 
finally have reestablished European political · and financial 
stability by reincorporating Germany into the Great Power 
Club. That sense of stability was, however, an illusion, for 
Germany's thirst to revise the map of Europe in her favor had 
not yet . been quenched. 
more dangerous set of 
Ultimately, Locarno 
compromises than was 
may have been a 
Versailles; the 
latter settlement kept Germany bound in several critical 
areas. Locarno, reinforced by France's new willingness to 
live and let live, ensured that Germany would soon be free to 
rearm and rebuild. It appeared as if the Treaty of Locarno 
satisfied 
Germany. 
the national 
Britain was 
interests of Britain, France and 
assured of an economically viable 
Germany; France finally had the military guarantee to her 
eastern border; and Germany was tacitly released from the 
harsher restrictions imposed upon her by Versailles. This 
satisfaction of Great Power interests, however, came at the 
expense of Eastern Europe, a region in which Germany would 
eventually turn her · roaming eyes. Thus, the settlements of 
1925 did not finalize the issues of 1919; they only deferred 
them until 1939. 
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II. REVOLUTION IN GERMANY, THE FALL OF THE SECOND REICH AND 
THE ARMISTICE AT COMPI~GNE. 
By the end of October 1918, things had been going poorly 
for the German war effort for some time. In July 1917 the 
Reichstag, the lower house of German parliament, passed a 
resolution inviting the government to consider a peace by 
negotiation. The High Command responded to this plea from 
parliament by planing for one final, giant offensive that was 
to bring Germany victory. The thought of a negotiated peace 
had not sat well with the High Command, for many felt that it 
would bring to Germany "a democratic swamp into which we 
should be drawn undoubtedly after a lukewarm peace."8 Thus, 
on 21 March 1918 the so-called Ludendorff Offensive (named 
after one of its chief architects, General Erich Ludendorff, 
the hero of Liege and Tannenberg) opened with a bang and the 
might of the entire German army was thrown against the western 
front. It failed, however; on 8 August, the British Fourth 
Army under Rawlinson broke through while Allied · tanks smashed 
the German line to pieces. By the beginning of September, the 
Allied armies were pushing forward at nearly every point on 
the German front; and by September's end, Bulgaria, Turkey and 
Austria, Germany's war-time allies, were prepared to sue for 
peace. 
Events then began to move with lightning speed. On 3 
October, Ludendorff 's nerve broke and he informed the German 
government that "the condition of the army demands an 
19 
immediate armistice in order to avoid a catastrophe."9 This 
announcement hit the government like a bombshell. Many of the 
German people had believed, as late as September, that victory 
was close at hand. Nevertheless, Prince Max von Baden, 
recently appointed chancellor by the emperor at the end of 
September, appealed through the Swiss government to President 
Wilson for a peace based upon the Fourteen Points of his 
address to Congress on 8 January 1918.10 
On 26 October, William II, German emperor, dismissed 
Ludendorff from the High Command; three days later he departed 
Berlin for army headquarters, still confident of victory. On 
that same day, rumor had spread in the naval base at Kiel that 
the German High Seas Fleet was going to be ordered to take to 
sea, perhaps for one last stand against the British. The 
German sailors, however, had not seen action for more than two 
years and they were unwilling to rush into battle 
overwhelming force. They mutinied, and two days 
carried the violence through the streets of Kiel.11 
against an 
later they 
By 4 
November, the sailors had taken Kiel and established a Workers 
and Soldiers Council, based on the soviet models which had 
recently sprung up all over Russia. Revolution soon proceeded 
to Lubeck, Hamburg, and several other towns across Germany. On 
8 November, a Constituent Soldiers, Workers and Peasants 
Council was established in Munich, headed by Kurt Eisner, who 
proclaimed the creation of a Bavarian Democratic and Social 
Republic.12 
The German government was convinced, now more than ever, 
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that all of Germany was about to 
war was not ended quickly. At 
succumb to revolution if the 
8:00 A.M. on 8 November, 
Matthias Erzberger, head of the German Armistice Commission, 
and a number of German representatives met with Marshall Foch 
and Admiral Wemyss, the supreme Allied naval spokesman, in a 
railway car at Rethondes in the forest of Compiegne. Foch 
read the Allied terms for peace; there appeared to be some 
concern in Paris that the Germans might not · accept terms so 
harsh.13 Events were to make the Germans jump at the chance 
of armistice, however. On 9 November, a republic was 
proclaimed in Berlin- "The Hohenzollerns have abdicated. Long 
live the great German Republic! .. 14 Prince Max 
office as chancellor, declaring that Emperor 
the crown prince intended to relinquish their 
German and Pruss ian . thrones. The office of 
resigned 
William II 
rights to 
chancellor 
his 
and 
the 
was 
handed over to Friedrich Ebert, leader of the Majority 
headquarters, Socialist Party. At Spa, the German army 
William I I boarded a train on the morning of 10 November; 
several hours later, he crossed over the Dutch border and two 
days later he signed his formal abdication as King of Prussia 
and Emperor of Germany. He was never to return to Germany.15 
Meanwhile, Erzberger had been given instructions by the 
new government in Berlin to sign an armistice at once, at any 
terms. At 5:00 on the morning of 11 November 1918 he signed 
Allied representatives with a the armistice and presented 
declaration which ended: 
the 
"A nation of 
peoples suffers, but it does not die." 
seventy millions of 
Foch replied "Tres 
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bien" and withdrew from the railway carriage.16 At 11:00 that 
same morning, the cease-fire sounded along the western front. 
The war between the soldiers had ended; the war between the 
diplomats was about to begin. 
When, on 4 October 1918,. Prince Max appealed to the 
American government, as opposed to the British or French, he 
had several compelling reasons to do so. The first involved 
the character of President Wilson and those ideals which he 
had put forward which seemed to imply that an American peace 
with Germany would be a just one. By early 1917, Wilson had 
come to the conclusion that the only way in 
would have any influence over the settlement 
which America 
which would 
eventually end the war was for her to renounce her neutrality 
and become a belligerent. Wilson had become convinced that 
the "old diplomacy"- the pursuit of a balance of power, the 
practice of power politics, and clandestine negotiations 
between states- had overwhelmingly aided in the outbreak of 
this war. If Europe was to · avoid a repeat of this 
catastrophe, then a "new diplomacy" of openness and a 
community of states must be formulated. Only a peace between 
equals without victory, not between victor and vanquished, 
could endure .1 7 Such a peace would involve equality among 
nations and the right of peoples everywhere to national 
self-determination.18 He believed that he spoke for "the 
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silent mass of mankind everywhere" who could not "speak their 
real hearts concerning the death and ruin they see to have 
come already upon persons and homes they hold most dear."19 
Wilson's address to a joint session of Congress on 8 
January 1918 brought this message home quite clearly. The 
message enumerated a program of peace based on the Fourteen 
Points, which are worth listing because they were to come into 
play somewhat later at the proceedings in Paris, 1919: 
1. Open covenants openly arrived at; 
2. freedom of the seas; 
3. the removal, so far as possible, of all economic 
barriers; 
4. the reduction of armaments to the lowest point 
consistent with domestic safety; 
5. an impaitial adjustment of all colonial claims, with 
the interests of the people equal to the claims of 
the government; 
6. the evacuation of Russian territory and the free 
determination of its own political and national 
policy; 
7. the evacuation and restoration of Belgium; 
8. the evacuation of French territory and the return of 
Alsace-Lorraine to France; 
9. the readjustment of Italian frontiers along the lines 
of nationality; 
10. the opportunity for autonomous development for the 
peoples of Austria-Hungary; 
11. the evacuation of Rumanian, Serbian and Montenegrin 
territory and access to the sea for Serbia; 
12. the Turkish parts of the Ottoman Empire to be given 
sovereignty, autonomy for other parts of the Empire 
under Turkish rule, and the Dardanelles to be 
opened to the ships of all nations; 
13. an independent Poland, to include territories 
indisputably Polish, with free and secure access to 
the sea; 
14. a general association of nations to be formed to 
afford mutual guarantees of political independence 
and territorial integrity to great and small states 
alike. 
The President appears to have had several reasons for 
making this speech, other than stating those points on which 
he thought the peace should be founded. First, he sought to 
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persuade the Russians to terminate their separate peace 
negotiations with the Germans and to continue the war effort 
· on behalf of the Allies; secondly, to appeal to those members 
of the German government who were calling for an end to 
hostilities; and third, to drop a subtle hint to the Allies 
that their peace terms were going to have to be more liberal 
if America was to participate in the peacemaking.19 Wilson 
was also put off by the Russians, not only for negotiating a 
separate peace, but for confounding his efforts to demonstrate 
that the Allies stood on the higher moral ground. The 
Bolsheviks had recently published a number of secret treaties 
between Britain, France and several other states which smacked 
of the old style of diplomacy; the majority of these secret 
treaties consisted of land transfers between one state and 
another and in no way did 
national self-determination. 
they resemble the principle of 
Lenin, the new Bolshevik leader 
in Russia, was also calling for general self-determination and 
a peace without annexation or indemnities. Wilson, who 
perceived himself and the United States as the custodians of 
democratic freedom, had no desire to be outdone by a 
revolutionary leader who had seized power illegally and whose 
ideology ran contrary to nearly everything he held holy.21 
Whatever Wilson's · reasoning behind this plan for peace, 
it appealed to the Germans, who were convinced that a peace 
with the liberal-minded Americans was sure to be far better 
than anything they could get from the British or French. The 
Germans hoped to seize the opportunity afforded them by the 
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growing discrepancies in the Allied camp. It had been no 
great secret that Wilson was only slightly less wary of 
British and French war aims than he was of the German's and 
that he was not entirely certain 
use of the naval blockade that 
that America, 
of the legality of Britain's 
was slowly starving Germany. 
like Britain, would welcome They also reasoned 
an opportunity to 
implying lenient 
invest in and trade with post-war Germany, 
financial terms 
the Germans anticipated that the 
at the settlement. Finally, 
Allies might perceive Germany 
themselves and the communist as a "buffer state" between 
abomination in the east. There was a growing fear, 
particularly in the war-ravaged states of Western Europe that, 
if left unchecked, communism might sweep across a continent 
populated by peoples weary of war and the condition of 
destitution it left them in. 
When the appeal for peace came on 4 October, Wilson 
jumped at it, bypassing the French, British and the Supreme 
War Council, fearing that their punitive peace terms · could 
only hinder the chance for a settlement. On 8 October, he 
informed the Germans that peace talks would be initiated only 
if they accepted his Fourteen Points as the basis of peace, if 
they could assure him that the chancellor spoke for the German 
people as well as the High Command, and if they evacuated all 
Allied territories prior to the armistice.22 
The Allies were enraged; not only had Wilson usurped them 
diplomatically, but he committed them to peace terms which 
they had not previously agreed upon. They insisted that 
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Wilson had afforded the Germans too much so far as their 
military was concerned; evacuation of the Allies western 
territories would allow the Germans to regroup in the east and 
re-engage if the peace talks faltered. Wilson should have 
allowed the military experts, the Supreme War Council, to fix 
military requirements for an armistice.23 
Further, the French and British had 
Fourteen Points as a basis for peace. 
never accepted the 
Lloyd George feared, 
quite correctly, that with the Fourteen Points, "the Huns will 
try to assume that [they are] the only condition, and, when we 
insist on other conditions, they will say that we intervened 
and upset a promising negotiation for peace." 24 In a long 
discus sian with Colonel Edward House, Wilson 1 s represen ta ti ve 
in Europe prior to his arrival, the British Prime Minister put 
forth his objections quite firmly: "Do we or do we not accept 
the whole of President Wilson 1 s Fourteen Points? I am going 
to put quite clearly the points which I do not accept. Should 
we not make it clear to the German Government that 
going in on the Fourteen Points of peace?"25 One 
particular was absolutely non-negotiable where 
were concerned- freedom of the seas (Pt. I I) . 
we are not 
Point in 
the British 
They had no 
intention of allowing terms 
blockade dictated to them. 
for shipping or the legality of a 
Great Britain was not yet ready to 
relinquish her command over the high seas. 
We have already seen France 1 s designs 
Fourteen Points were simply going to be 
settlement plans the French had in mind. 
for Germany. The 
too soft for any 
The French Prime 
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Minister, Georges Clemenceau, an octogenarian for whom the 
last German offense in 1870 was within living memory and "for 
whom hatred and fear of the Germans was a law of nature",26 
was determined to see that Germany never again be able to 
wreak havoc in Europe; as to Clemenceau 1 s attitude toward the 
Fourteen Points: "God has given us the Ten Commandments, and 
we broke them. Wilson gives us the Fourteen Points. We shall 
see."27 
Wilson had not even bothered to communicate his 
correspondence with Germany to the Allied chiefs until 23 
October. In the meantime, on 14 October, in what appears to 
have been a concession to the Allies, Wilson informed the 
Germans that they would have to allow the Allies to fix 
armistice terms which would ensure Allied military supremacy, 
and that they would have to end their wartime activities on 
land and sea. A week later, the Germans agreed, assuring 
Wilson that the German Chancellor spoke for both the High 
Command and the German people. 28 The concession by Wilson was 
brought about by inter-Allied wrangling prior to this 
communication. The British and French finally acquiesced in 
accepting Wilson 1 s terms of peace, if only because of House 1 s 
tacit threat that the President might decide to conclude a 
separate peace if they refused to budge. Their agreement was 
subject to two very important qualifications, however: First, 
the Allies reserved complete discretion concerning the freedom 
of the seas- a major victory for the British against the 
American hatred of blockade. Secondly, that all invaded 
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territories must be res.tored and "that compensation will be 
made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population 
of the Allies and their by the aggression of Germany by land, . 
by sea, and from the air",29 a victory for the French, whose 
northeastern territories had been so devastated by the war. 
On 5 November United States Secretary of State Robert 
Lansing, through the so-called Lansing Note, informed the 
German government that the United States was prepared to make 
peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points, subject to the two 
British and French qualifications. The Germans accepted both 
the principles of the Note and its qualifications, and the 
Note thus became a binding contract known as the Pre-Armistice 
Agreement. Upon German acceptance, House wrote of the 
Agreement's qualifications: "I am glad the exceptions were 
made, for it emphasizes the acceptance of the Fourteen 
Points. If they had not dissented in any way, but had let the 
Armistice be made without protest, they would have been in a 
better position at the Peace Conference to object to them."30 
Apparently, House did not recognize Lloyd George's and 
Clemenceau's resourcefulness. 
The Germans were by this time prepared to accept any 
terms of peace in order to avoid the outbreak of revolution 
throughout the entire country. Hence, the Armistice was 
signed on the morning of 11 November. The German army, still 
unbroken, stood everywhere on foreign soil. The Germans were 
to hand over to the Allies the majority of their war material 
and their fleet; they were to withdraw from all territories in 
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the west; the Allies were to occupy German terri tory on the 
left bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads for fifty miles 
past it; finally, the German Treaties of Brest-Li tovsk with 
Russia and Bucarest with Romania were annulled.31 The terms 
were those proposed by Marshall Foch, and lay between those of 
the British Field Marshal Haig, who advocated more lenient 
terms, and those of the American General Pershing, who argued 
in favor of refusing any armistice and pressing on for 
unconditional surrender. 
For the German High Command, even with these strict terms 
of armistice imposed upon them, the situation did not appear 
to be as bad as it might have been; so long as Wilson was 
going to have anything to say at the peace settlement, and it 
appeared that he was going to have a great deal to say, then 
there was a chance that the settlement would not be unbearably 
punitive for Germany. What they did not realize, however, was 
the amount of compromise that Wilson had been obliged to make 
in order to secure any of his plans for Allied acceptance of 
the Fourteen Points. On 29 October, House held a secret 
meeting with Clemenceau and Lloyd George, during which the two 
Allied premiers voiced all of their concerns regarding 
Wilson's pronouncements. House recorded all of these in the 
form of a "Commentary," which he subsequently cabled to Wilson 
in Washington.32 The Commentary, which was never forwarded to 
the Germans, was to destroy any advantages which the defeated 
states might have received from a peace based upon the 
Fourteen Points; in it were included the Allies' plans for the 
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dismemberment 
colonies, the 
of Austria-Hungary, the 
partition of Prussia by 
removal of Germany's 
a "Polish Corridor" to 
the Baltic Sea, and · preliminary discussions on the topic of 
reparations. The Commentary outlined, quite neatly, many of 
the features of the Treaty of Versailles that were to convince 
the Germans that the peace was Carthaginian.33 
The Commentary · foreshadowed the first of many follies 
that resulted from the Allies' inability to cooperate in 
matters concerning Germany. The Germans surrendered with the 
belief that peace was going to be negotiated, between equals, 
not between victor and vanquished. The Commentary clearly 
implied something else. Many Germans would come to perceive 
themselves as having been "swindled" into peace ; the Allies 
appeared 
The fact 
to have promised 
that the Allies 
one 
had 
government, which was perceived 
illegitimate successor to the 
thing and delivered another. 
negotiated with a republican 
by many in Germany to be an 
Prussi an monarchy, served only 
to reinforce the already growing myth of the Dolchstoss- a 
"stab in the back" inflicted by pacifists and defeatists on 
the home front.34 In reality, the German army had not been 
defeated. 
Germany, 
Ebert, the head of the new republican government in 
greeted returning German formations at the 
Brandenburg Gate in Berlin with the words "No foe has overcome 
you ... You have protected the homeland from enemy invasion."35 
The heroic army ·had kept the homeland intact; and the fact 
that not a single member of its High Command had participated 
in the Armistice Commission did not help matters any. It is 
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probably quite true that the . Allies, had the Germans not 
agreed to armistice, 
until they did. The 
would 
German 
have proceeded to smash forward 
people did not take this into 
account, however, and anything short of victory and the return 
to empire was bound to displease them. All of this would 
reinforce Germany 1 s hatred of the Treaty of Versailles and the 
subsidiary position in which it placed her. 
Thus, the pre-armistice negotiations and the Armistice at 
Compiegne set the stage for all the difficulties that were to 
come. The elections during the latter months of 1918 ensured 
that the three Allied premiers- Wilson, Lloyd George and 
Clemenceau- would be in power to chart the course in Paris; 
they also demonstrated to the three exactly what it was that 
their electorates would be expecting there. In Britain, 
during the so-called "khaki" election of December 1918, the 
politically astute Lloyd George, who was well aware of his 
peoples 1 desire to see the Germans suffer, spoke 
world free from war, 
the Germans pay. "I 
of punishing the kaiser, and 
wi 11 make the Germans pay" 
of a new 
of making 
said Lloyd 
George, and added softly 
much as they can."36; his 
during the 
coalition 
roaring 
won a 
applause 
majority 
" ... as 
of five 
hundred and twenty six out of seven hundred and seven seats in 
the House of Commons. 37 At the end of December, Clemenceau 
won a four hundred and fourteen to six victory in the Chamber 
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of Deputies.37 It _was Wilson who suffered the greatest 
setback during the American elections. - In a public address on 
24 October, Wilson declared that if the electorate did not 
return a Democratic majority to Congress during the 5 November 
elections, the Europeans would perceive it "as a repudiation 
of my leadership."; 
a majority of 
House.39 Most 
chairmanship 
two 
the election results gave the Republicans 
in the Senate and of forty-five in the 
significantly, however, the elections 
of the powerful Senate 
Committee to Henry Cabot Lodge, the man who 
lead the defeat in American ratification 
Versailles. 
Forei<;rn 
was to 
of the 
gave the 
Relations 
eventually 
Treaty of 
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III. THE PEACE OF PARIS AND THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES. 
By January 1919, 
nearly every part of 
Paris was teeming with visitors 
the globe. The delegations of 
from 
the 
twenty-seven victorious nations included politicians, military 
men, and experts in law, finance and geography.40 Along with 
the delegations were hundreds of advisers, clerks and nd 
journalists, all come to Paris to witness the peace making.41 
President Wilson boarded the George Washington and arrived in 
Paris on 13 December 1918; his own delegation included one 
hundred and fifty academic experts known as "the Inquiry" 
(later re-christened "the American Intelligence"), ensuring 
that the Americans would be the best-informed group in 
Paris.42 The President was greeted euphorically by the people 
of the city aml.dst an intoxicating atmosphere of hope. Here 
was the man who might free Europe forever from the specter of 
war and banish the outmoded methods of politics that had led 
to it. The confidence engendered by the President in Paris 
1919 belied much . of the desolation that existed outside the 
city's limits. 
The physical losses inflicted by the Great War had been 
immense. Excluding Russia's losses, eight million men were 
lost in combat, seven million were left permanently disabled, 
and five million civilians were lost to "war-induced 
causes. u43_ these figures represented approximately seven 
percent of Europe's population.44 In addition, another 
fifteen million persons were left "more or less seriously 
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wounded."45 The influenza epidemic of 1918-1919 was thought 
to have swept away another twenty million lives worldwide. 
Russian casual ties were even worse: twenty-eight million 
people killed (eighteen percent of her total population) as a 
result of the war and an unknown number lost during the civil 
war which followed the Russian withdrawal in March 1918.46 
Nearly half of all the physical losses occurred in Russia, 
with France, Germany and Italy also severely hit.47 
Accompanying the staggering physical losses were the 
material costs of the war. Compounding the enormous damage 
done to infrastructure and industrial and agricultural 
capacity, were shipping losses, the tremendous costs incurred 
through full-mobilization of giant military forces, and the 
foreign debt raised by the combatants to finance their war 
efforts; the total bill for over four years of total warfare 
exceeded three hundred billion dollars, or "six and a half 
times the sum of all national debt accumulated in the world 
from the end of the eighteenth century up to the eve of the 
First World War."48 By 1919, the European Allies were 
indebted · to the United States to the sum of twelve and a half 
billion dollars; by the end of the 1920's, this would increase 
to twenty one billion dollars.49 Between 1913 and 1920, 
European manufacturing fell by twenty three percent; world 
manufacturing 
agricultural 
normal. In 
had 
production 
all, it was 
decreased by seven percent while 
was approximately one-third below 
estimated that Europe suffered an 
eight year setback in industrial development as a result of 
the war.50 
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In addition to facing the physical and material losses 
of the war, the delegates in Paris were confronted with the 
pressures imposed by current events. A series of large-scale 
strikes, particularly in Great Brita in and Italy, further 
disrupted the already dangerously weak European economy. The 
influenza virus was killing millions and needed to be dealt 
with rapidly. Throughout Europe, there were serious food 
shortages, and many regions (such as Vienna) were on the brink 
of starvation. Finally, even as the Great Powers were 
concluding their armed hostilities, the smaller states in 
Eastern Europe, struggling to find their own place in the sun 
after the fall of the German, Russian and Austro-Hungarian 
Empires, were dueling it out in border conflicts and 
committing atrocities of their own.51 
The growing "specter of communism" was also on the minds 
of those present in Paris. There appeared to be a very real 
threat that the peoples of Western Europe, weary of war and of 
the governments that had imposed it upon them, might be swept 
up by Marxist doctrine and proceed to revolt. The Allies had 
become increasingly concerned with the ongoing Russian civil 
war as Lenin's Bolshevik regime slowly · tightened its grip 
around Russia. American, French and British (and the 
Japanese in Vladivostok) troops had been present in Russia 
since March 1918 with the ostensible mission of salvaging war 
materiel that had been supplied to the former czarist regime 
in its fight against the Central Powers. No one wanted to see 
these supplies wind up in German hands once Lenin surrendered 
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to the Germans at Brest-Li tovsk that same month. There was 
also the hope (fostered particularly by the French) that 
Allied military support of the anti-Bolshevik White forces 
springing up throughout Russia might succeed in overthrowing 
Lenin and his communist cronies. A new government, one more 
sympathetic to the Allied cause, 
continue the Russian war effort on 
might be 
Germany's 
convinced to 
eastern front, 
thereby relieving the west. The capitulation of 
November 1918 erased any 
personnel in Russia, but 
latter months of 1919.52 
overt cause for Allied 
Germany in 
military 
troops were not evacuated until the 
Communism had also been a growing threat in Germany. 
Many of the revolutionary groups which had appeared throughout 
the country at war's end were Marxist in nature. The German 
Socialist Party, which came to power after the fall of the 
November 1918, had divided along imperial regime in 
ideological beliefs. The first, led by the new chancellor and 
Majority Socialist leader Friedrich 
anti-communist), along with his 
Ebert (a 
compatriot 
forsworn 
Philipp 
Scheidemann, was revisionist in nature, having surrendered the 
belief in the necessity of· violent revolution to achieve their 
goals. This group was opposed by two others, the most 
influential being the so-called Spartacists (after January 
1919- the German Communist Party), led by Karl Liebknecht, son 
of the founder of the German Social Democratic Party, and Rosa 
Luxemburg. The Spartacists adhered to Marxist doctrine and 
sought the overthrow of the state through an armed worker's 
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revolution, and were supported in their efforts by the smaller 
Independent Socialist Party.53 
The two latter groups threatened Ebert 1 s efforts to 
restore peace and public order by fostering strikes, 
demonstrations and armed putsches. The chancellor was forced 
to turn to the High Command, with whom the fledgling 
republican government had shared anything but cordial 
relations since the signing of the armistice in November, for 
aid in suppressing the ongoing revel ts. 
direction, 
ex-soldiers, 
volunteer forces 
the Freikorps, 
comprised of 
were built 
Under 
roaming 
up to 
the army 1 s 
bands of 
aid the 
government in avoiding complete revolution on the Russian 
scale. Ebert 1 s reliance upon these soldiers is significant 
because they would prove very difficult to disband somewhat 
later, even after their obvious antipathy for the new 
government had been revealed.54 
In January 1919, the same month in which the Paris Peace 
Conference was formally convened, the Spartacists did 
an armed insurrection in Berlin, and for four days 
attempt 
the city 
fell to communism. By 10 January, however, the Freikorps had 
advanced 
quelled-
into Berlin and, by the 15th, the uprising was 
Liebknecht and Luxemburg were murdered, the 
Spartacists lay scattered, and Berlin was once again in the 
hands of Ebert 1 s government. 55 By the end of the month, the 
government was strong enough to proceed with counter 
revolutionary measures throughout the rest of the country. In 
March 1919, a second Spartacist uprising in Berlin was 
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crushed, and in June order was restored in Munich. At long 
last, Ebert was able to call for a National Assembly; 
elections had been held on 19 January 1919, and the government 
first gathered in the town of Weimar on 6 February 1919.56 
The Paris Peace Conference was formally convened on 18 
January 1919. The negotiations were long and arduous, and it 
was not until 23 July 1923 that the final treaty of peace was 
signed with Turkey at Lausanne. In the intervening time, five 
other treaties were signed between the victors and the 
vanquished in · the suburbs of Paris: The Treaty of Versailles 
with Germany on 28 June 1919; the Treaty of 
Saint-Germain-en-Laye with Austria on 10 September; the Treaty 
of Neuilly with Bulgaria on 27 November; the Treaty of Trianon 
with Hungary on 4 June 1920 (the conclusion of this treaty was 
delayed due to the Hungarian fall to communism under Bela Kun 
until 1 August 1919 and then by the subsequent Rumanian 
. occupation of Budapest); and the Treaty of Sevres with Turkey 
on 10 August 1920 (a short-lived treaty due to the Turkish 
nationalist uprising under Mustafa Kemal). The treaties were 
both political and economic in nature, involving the redrawing 
of the European map along the 1 ines of 
the setting of financial indemnities. 
self-determination and 
The giant Treaty of 
Versailles, consisting of some four hundred and 
articles, was the most important of the settlements. 
forty 
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In preparing for the conference, the Allied leaders 
decided against establishing a system of organization 
resembling that of Vienna in 1814-15. Many felt that the 
Great War might never have occurred had the peacemakers in 
Vienna understood the social, political and financial problems 
that Europe would face throughout 
The Vienna 
the remainder of the 
nineteenth century. plenipotentiaries were 
diplomats and statesmen, but they were not "experts." Had 
they been accompanied by individuals more qualified to predict 
the dilemmas of the future, the settlement might have 
prevented the outbreak of war in 1914.57 Hence Wilson came 
armed with his Inquiry, of which it was said "Had the Treaty 
of Peace been drafted solely by the American experts, i.t would 
have been one of the wisest as well as the most scientific 
documents ever devised", 58 while every other delegation 
brought with it some team of persons qualified to analyze the 
post-war political and socio-economic difficulties. Another 
reason for avoiding the Vienna schematic had to do with 
Wilson's ideas regarding the old style of diplomacy. The 
President explicitly rejected (and advised the Allies to do 
the same) the Congress of Vienna as a basis for making peace 
with Germany and the Central Powers, arguing that it served 
only to "extend the system of monarchical . and arbitrary 
government in the world."59 
There had been no preliminary agreement as to what sort 
of peace should be made with Germany; the United States, Great 
Britain and France all came to Paris looking to achieve 
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different ends through the settlement with Germany._ Because 
there was no agreed basis for peace, the teams of experts 
representing the various states found it very difficult to 
compromise; one committee would formulate one plan which often 
conflicted with the 
Minute details were 
plan 
dealt 
of another 
with on 
and 
an 
deadlock resulted. 
individual basis, 
without any clear view of the peace settlement as a whole. As 
a result, the Conference proceeded in a willy-nilly sort of 
fashion, with only a vague preconception of what the final 
settlement might resemble- "Instead of drawing the picture 
with big lines, they are drawing it like an etching."60 
The European Allies, particularly the French, assumed 
that a set of preliminary terms would be agreed upon amongst 
themselves, after which the Germans would be invited to 
negotiate. The French delegation had drawn up a conference 
program along these lines and submitted them to Wilson as 
early as 29 November 1918. The program even included the great 
concession by the Allies of annulling all the secret treaties 
that they had concluded during the war. The wording of the 
French draft irritated the President, however, and the matter 
was dropped. 61 Without preliminary terms, the Germans could 
not be invited to negotiate, and the peace settlement would 
have to be dictated. 
The body originally devised to coordinate the 
proceedings in 
representatives 
States, Great 
Paris was a Council of Ten, composed of two 
from each of the Principal Allies- the United 
Britain, France, Italy and Japan. This body 
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proved too unwieldy, however, and two others were subsequently 
established to replace it: The Council of Four- Wilson, Lloyd 
Clemenceau and Italian Prime Minister Vittorio George, 
Orlando- to serve as the executive body and ultimate 
arbiters; and a Council of Five, composed of the foreign 
ministers of the five Principal Allies previously cited, to 
deal with financial questions, particularly those arising from 
Britain's in-shore naval blockade of Germany, as well as the 
reports of the Territorial Committees.62 These committees 
were teams of experts assigned the task of redrawing national 
boundaries along the lines of national self-determination and 
confronting the problems which arose from this. Finally, 
there was a Plenary Conference, on which the lesser states 
sat, to deal with questions of war guilt, minor reparations, 
the League of Nations, international 
international transportation.63 
labor legislation and 
It quickly became 
decision-making bureaucracy was 
apparent that the entire 
simply too slow and clumsy to 
move matters 
(Wilson of 
along 
the 
at any reasonable pace. The Big Four 
United States, Lloyd George of Britain, 
Clemenceau of France and Orlando of · Italy; Japan was present 
only for discussions concerning the Far East) began to meet in 
Wilson's private hotel room to finalize a peace settlement. 
It was in the final week of March 1919, just as the Big Four 
were beginning their private negotiations, 
wrote the Fontainebleau Memorandum of 
that . Lloyd George 
25 March- "Some 
Considerations for the Peace Conference before They Finally 
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Draft Their Terms" .64 This memo represented the first broad 
overview of the salient problems of making peace with Germany, 
some two months after the Peace Conference had convened.65 
The intervening time had been filled by, amongst other 
distractions, Wilson's insistence on concluding the final 
draft of the · Covenant 
countless, wearisome 
Eastern delegates.66 
of the League of Nations, as 
hearings of Central European 
well as 
and Near 
For the next month or so the Big Three 
(we shall necessarily omit Italy from our discussion of the 
Treaty) set themselves to finalizing a settlement with 
Germany. 
French territorial claims, already advanced in 1917, 
focused on two regions along the Franco-German frontier: the 
provinces of Alsace-Lorraine and the Rhineland. A French note 
of 12 January 1917 stipulated that "Alsace and Lorraine must 
be restored to us not in the mutilated condition in which they 
were left by the treaty of 1815, but with the frontiers as 
they existed before 1790. We shall thus have the geographic 
and mineral basin of the Saar."67 Regarding the Rhineland, 
the French sought "to see the terri tory to the west of the 
Rhine separated from the German Empire and erected into 
something in the nature of a buffer state".68 These French 
concerns regarding the eastern frontier . were well-founded; 
there was no Channel separating themselves from the Germans, 
nor for that matter were there any natural barriers.69 France 
could not afford to remain so vulnerable should the Germans 
resume hostilities at some point in ~he future. 
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There was also grave concern in France over Germany's 
growing numbers: in 1919, France's total population numbered 
thirty-nine million persons, while the Germans counted 
sixty-three million. 70 The wartime "birth deficits," caused 
by the inability of the population to renew itself at previous 
levels due to so many men away at the front,71 accompanied by 
the loss of nearly one and a half rni 11 ion fighting men, meant 
that the already declining French birthrate was about to dip 
even lower, while the ratio of German to French births was 
soon to become two to one. These 
Germans would be quite capable of 
in the future while France would 
fodder to throw against them.72 
numbers implied that the 
fielding very large armies 
have cornpara ti vely 1 it tle 
The French, therefore, sought to create their own 
version of a Channel between thernsel ves and Germany, namely, 
the Rhineland. There were those in France who desired to see 
Germany cast back to its pre-Bisrnarckian state of a number of 
small, independent units lacking a unifying central 
government; several separatist movements in 
Catholic southern and western Germany, striving 
predominantly 
to break free 
from the 
seductive 
reality. 73 
and the 
Protestant, Pruss ian yoke, offered the French a 
invitation to support that dream in 
This scheme was thoroughly un-Wilsonian, 
British and Americans would not tolerate 
becoming 
however, 
French 
support of these separatist movements. Recall that Clemenceau 
also carne equipped with Marshall Foch' s plan for separating 
the Rhineland from the rest of Germany and reestablishing it 
as a French protectorate. 
grounds that this would 
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}\gain the .Allies objected, on the 
engender bitter German resentment. 
Moreover, national self-determination dictated that the 
Rhineland remain a part of Germany; a plebiscite in the region 
would almost certainly have proved that its inhabitants had no 
desire for political independence from Germany.74 
Thus, Clemenceau was forced to compromise on a cardinal 
demand. In return for relinquishing the Rhineland ultimatum, 
the French Premier received several concessions from the 
Allies. The 
enlarged and 
Nations for 
plebiscite 
sovereignty. 
terri tory of 
placed under 
a period 
would be 
the Saar Basin was 
the authority of 
of fifteen years, 
held to determine 
to be slightly 
the League of 
after which a 
the region 1 s 
The valuable coal mines of the Saar were to be 
placed at French disposal in compensation for the ruined ones 
in northeastern France. Secondly, the west bank of the Rhine 
and a fifty kilometer \vide area on the eastern bank was to 
become a permanently demilitarized zone; and the Allies were 
to occupy the Rhine 1 s west bank and bridgeheads, partitioning 
the region into three zones (British, French and American), 
one of which was to be evacuated each five years up to fifteen 
years so long as Germany continued to fulfill the obligations 
imposed upon her by the peace settlement.75 
Reinforcing these territorial provisions were a number 
of restrictions to be placed on the German military. The 
German army was to be permanently reduced to one hundred 
thousand men (equivalent to a domestic peacekeeping force) and 
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the manufacture of all offensive-type weapons was 
prohibited.76 In addition, the General Staff, the War Academy 
and the cadet schools, all thought to be the breeding grounds 
of German militarism, were dissolved. It is interesting to 
note that the French had been willing to tolerate a larger 
army based on short-term conscription. The Americans and 
British 
popular, 
however, with whom conscription had never been 
insisted that the future German army should be 
composed of long-term volunteers, 
twenty-five years, and the other 
long-run this was problematic, for 
off from civilian life. Many of 
the officers serving for 
ranks for twelve. In the 
it sealed the German army 
these officers had served 
under the imperial regime and were anything but sympathetic to 
the German government's progress toward democracy.77 A 
hardened corps of anti-Weimar officers did not make for 
fostering a new . generation of Weimar-loyal soldiers, nor did 
it do anything for the growing rift between the government and 
the military. 
Finally, the French received an Anglo-American military 
guarantee of immediate armed assistance should Germany once 
again come knocking at France's eastern door. The guarantee 
was a formidable one on paper and it appeared as if France 
might have achieved the 
Evidently Clemenceau did 
security she so desperately sought. 
not think so, however, perhaps with 
some prescience of what was to become of the Allies' guarantee 
in November 1919. The fortifying of France's eastern borders 
would not be enough; if German troops were forever to remain 
at home, then Germany had to be watched on all fronts. 
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Traditional policy dictated that France look to Russia 
to serve as sentry on Germany's eastern front. The Russian 
Revolution of 1917, however, ensured that this would no longer 
be possible; Lenin had made it quite clear that he had no 
intention of participating in Western machinations and, for 
the moment, there was no Franco-Soviet rapprochement in 
sight. Hence, France looked to the number of successor states 
in Eastern Europe which had arisen from the collapsed 
Austro-Hungarian Empire 
been forced to cede 
and from the regions which Russia had 
under the Treaty of Brest-Li tovsk. 
Through the Treaty of Versailles, France hoped to 
geographically strengthen these smaller states while 
simultaneously chipping away at Germany's eastern borders.78 
Germany was forced to cede to the newly reconstituted 
Poland (a state which had intermittently appeared and 
disappeared from Eastern Europe since the latter part of the 
eighteenth century) the regions of Posen and West Prussia with 
a "Corridor" to the Baltic Sea in fulfillment of Wilson's 
Thirteenth Point, which stipulated that Poland "should be 
assured a free and secure access to the sea." The German port 
of Danzig (Gdansk) became Poland's new outlet on the Baltic 
and was to be placed under the authority of the League of 
Nations as a "free city."79 Accompanying these territories 
were approximately one million German-speaking citizens who 
suddenly found themselves living within Polish frontiers;SO 
perhaps the old transference of souls was not so outdated 
after all. 
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In East Prussia, Germany lost the district of Memel. 
The future of Upper Silesia and the East Prussian districts of 
Allenstein and Marienwerder was to be determined by 
plebiscite. This was chiefly at the behest of the British, 
who were becoming alarmed by German losses in the east and did 
not share France's desire to make Poland "forte, forte, tres 
forte." Allenstein and Marienwerder eventually passed to 
Germany under a plebiscite 
the League divided Upper 
held in July 1920; in October 1921, 
Silesia so that Poland received a 
smaller (but far richer in resources) portion.81 
Further modifications of the German frontier ensured 
that the new state of Czechoslovakia, in order to provide her 
with adequate natural defenses, would receive a small wedge of 
Upper Silesia; within this wedge (the Sudetenland), however, 
lived three and a quarter million Germans. Once again, 
self-determination had been "overlooked" in Germany.83 The new 
rump-state of Austria, established under the Treaty of 
Saint-Germain-en-Laye on 10 September 1919, which now 
consisted of six and a half million German-speaking citizens, 
nearly one-third of which were concentrated in Vienna (causing 
great hardships in that city), was expressly forbidden from 
joining with greater Germany. An Austro-German union, while 
in accord with the principle of national self-determination, 
would have left Germany stronger than 
to see her.84 In the west, Germany 
infinitesimal districts of Eupen and 
any of the Allies wanted 
ceded to Belgium the 
Malmedy and Alsace and 
Lorraine were returned to France with 18 70 borders, sans the 
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Saar. A plebiscite was held in Germany 1 s northern province of 
Schleswig, subsequently dividing the region along a 
north-south line between Denmark and Germany.85 
The territorial provisions of Versailles bereft Germany 
of approximately fourteen percent of her lands and slightly 
over ten percent of her population. The principle of 
self-determination had been made to appear a matter of 
hypocrisy, for while it operated in great favor to Germany 1 s 
neighbors, it was, more often than not, detrimental to 
Germany. Great Britain resented France 1 s tinkering with 
German borders, fearing that it was bound to disincline the 
German people from accepting the settlement. Lloyd 
expressed this British sentiment quite clearly 
Fontainebleau Memorandum: 
I cannot conceive any greater cause of 
future war than that the German people, 
who have certainly proved themselves one 
of the most vigorous and powerful races 
in the world, should be surrounded by a 
number of small States, many of them 
consisting of people who have never 
previously set up a stable government for 
themselves, but each of them containing 
large masses of Germans clamouring for 
reunion with their native land.86 
Moreover, the British craved a return to pre-war 
George 
in his 
trading 
patterns, a vi tal part of which had been played by Germany. 
Prominent economists like J .M. Keynes (see below) convinced 
many in the British government that the peace with Germany 
must not be overwhelmingly punitive. The French, of course, 
had not seen it this way, and the two Allies found themselves 
clashing over both the territorial and the economic 
consequences of the peace. 
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The British came to Paris with several overriding 
objectives. The first involved ensuring that the German navy 
never again be able to threaten Britain's lifeline to her 
overseas . Empire. Versailles effectively removed this threat 
by reducing the German navy to a token six warships and 
prohibiting submarines.87 Germany also lost all her merchant 
vessels over sixteen hundred tons gross and half those between 
sixteen hundred and one thousand tons gross.88 Lloyd George 
also secured Wilson's pledge to negotiate the extent of Point 
II- "the absolute freedom of navigation alike in peace and 
war"; this concern was eventually dropped after the President 
realized Lloyd George's steadfast refusal to allow British 
maritime policy to be dictated by the League. 
The German colonial threat had also been removed. In a 
meeting with Lloyd George and the British Foreign Secretary, 
Lord Balfour, at Buclcingham Palace just after Christmas 1918, 
Wilson, 
of all 
whose Fifth Point called for 
colonial claims," made it 
"an impartial adjustment 
clear that he too was 
against returning Germany's colonies to her- the Hun had been 
convicted of inhumane treatment of colonial native populations 
through economic exploitation and militarization.89 The 
colonies now fell under the auspices of the League in the form 
of "Mandates." The League's Covenant provided for three 
classes of Mandates: "A," "B," and "C." "B" Mandates, which 
applied to the majority of Germany's African colonies, were 
deemed unfit and unqualified to administer themselves. In 
East Africa, the former German colony of Tanganyika became a 
British 
adjoining 
The port 
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Mandate, except for the two western provinces 
the Belgian Cong'?; these were mandated to Belgium. 
of Kionga was ceded to Portugal. In West Africa, 
Togoland and the Cameroons were divided between British and 
French Mandates. The "C" Manda tory was applied to German 
Southwest Africa, which passed to the Union of South Africa, 
and to Germany's Pacific holdings (the Caroline, Marshall and 
Marianas Islands; the Bismarck Archipelago), which were 
parceled out between Australia, New Zealand and Japan.90 
The British delegation also pursued the objective of 
reestablishing the continental balance of power. French 
meddling in Eastern Europe implied not only the weakening of 
Germany, but the formation of a formidable French bloc willing 
to flex its muscle any time Germany showed signs of stirring. 
In British eyes, a French dominated Europe was equivalent to 
the potential German hegemony that Great Britain had just 
succeeded in eliminating. 90 A return to the balance of pov1er 
would allow Great Britain to once again extricate herself from 
continental affairs, freeing her to concentrate on the 
Empire. Splendid isolation dictated that Britain be of Europe 
but not in Europe-91 "the desire for isolation, the knowledge 
that it is impossible- these are the two poles between which 
the needle of the British compass continues to waver."92 
The Anglo-French territorial disputes were exacerbated 
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by what was to become the breaking point for the Entente- the 
matter of Germany's indemnity. It was, perhaps, matters of 
money, more than anything else, which so vividly expressed the 
national interests of all parties involved in the forging of 
the peace with Germany, and it was, at least until 1924, these 
same matters which prevented them from reestablishing a sense 
of European financial and political stability. 
By the time the armistice was signed, France's ten 
northeastern departments had been destroyed. This region was 
once the heartland of French industrial productivity; four and 
a half years of trench warfare ensured that France would have 
to employ an inordinate 
fully rehabilitate the 
amount of capital and manpower to 
region to its pre-war capacity. 
Compounding the havoc wreaked by the war, the retreating 
policy similar German army had implemented a "scorched earth" 
Sherman's famous March to the Sea in many ways to General 
during the American Civil War. Nothing was left unscathed: 
homes were torched, farmlands were destroyed, mines were 
flooded, and lines of communication and transportation were 
torn to pieces. The Germans hoped not only to deny France the 
region's productive resources, but to ensure that the French 
economy would be set back for quite some time to come.93 
France had spent an enormous amount of money to finance 
her war effort and when the money ran out, she liquidated her 
foreign portfolio in order to raise further sums; when that 
well ran dry, she was forced to borrow- heavily. Like most of 
the other combatants, France had not raised domestic taxes to 
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finance the Great War. By the end of the war, France owed her 
creditors on Wall Street and in the City of London something 
to the tune of several billion dollars. The foreign debt, 
exacerbated by the loss of substantial investments in Russia 
(Lenin had canceled all the foreign debts incurred by the 
czarist regime upon coming to power), Austria-Hungary and 
Turkey brought France close to the point of financial 
insolvency. Without assistance, she would never be able to 
rebuild · the devastated regions, service her debt, and finance 
social programs for millions of war-stricken peoples.94 
Initially, the French had entertained the hope that the 
United States and Great Britain would, at least in part, 
finance reconstruction. During the latter stages of the war, 
a number of inter-Allied organizations had been established to 
pool, coordinate and allocate the partners' resources. The 
French sought to transform this quasi-common market into a 
peacetime economic bloc.95 Additionally, the French argued, 
as did the British, that the Americans · ought to write off the 
moneys owed them as part of their sacrifice for the war 
effort. The United States had emerged from the Great war 
virtually unscathed and far richer for it, while the French 
and British suffered enormous physical and financial 
hardships. In July 1919 Colonel House wrote to Wilson: 
Do you not think also that our people should 
be warned not to expect complete payment 
of loans to the Entente? Should they not 
be asked to consider a large share of these 
loans as a part of our necessary war 
expenditures, and should not an adjustment 
be suggested by us and not by our debtors?96 
Apparently the President did not see it this way. He swiftly 
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rejected the French proposal, and in December 1918 he 
dismantled the War Industries Board, thus eliminating American 
controls on raw materials and industrial government 
production. Soon thereafter, American involvement in the 
inter-Allied economic committees diminished and in the spring 
of 1919 the American Treasury Department announced that all 
future loans to the Allies would come not from Washington, but 
from Wall Street.97 
Thus, the French were forced to rely upon Germany for 
reparations. These would involve deliveries-in-kind 
of certain raw materials which the Germans possessed and the 
French desperately needed. There was also to be a moderate 
cash debt, which France would use to begin to pay off her own 
debts. 98 A fixed, moderate sum made sense; a high German 
reparations bill would have been bad business for nearly every 
party concerned. For the French, a high bill meant that 
Germany must increase her exports in order to generate enough 
surplus capital to pay the indemnity; an expansion of German 
exports was a severe detriment to those French products >vhich 
competed with Germany 1 s. For the British, a large German 
indemnity implied a decrease in Germany 1 s capacity to import, 
and that was precisely what the British did not want.99 
A moderate German debt, however, did not appear to be 
what the British or French peoples had in mind. In private, 
Lloyd George wished that a high indemnity could have been 
avoided; in public, however, he declared that Germany "must 
pay to the uttermost farthing." 100 Political expediency had 
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taken precedence over economic practicality. The publication 
of John Maynard Keynes' The Economic Consequences of the Peace 
in the closing days of 1919 would go far in reversing the 
British position on Germany's financial indemnity. For the 
moment, 
given 
however, 
now, they 
Lloyd 
would 
George argued that "If 
frighten rather than 
figures 
reassure 
were 
the 
Germans. Any figure that would not frighten them would be 
below the figure with which he and M. Clemenceau could face 
their peoples in the present state of public opinion."101 
Thus, public opinion dictated that the Germans sweat it 
out. Under the terms of the Lansing Note, the British share 
in the reparations would have been nominal compared to what 
the rest of the European Allies were to receive. Lloyd 
George, therefore, secured the inclusion of service pensions 
and allowances in 
German liability 
the category of damage done 
suddenly leapt from between 
to civilians. 
two and three 
billion pounds- which was realizable without destroying the 
German economy- to the far-off neighborhood of six billion 
pounds .102 Wilson eventually agreed to this preposterous sum, 
and when his advisers informed him that such a figure defied 
all logic, the President replied: "Logic! Logic! I don't give 
a damn for logic. I am going to include pensions!"103 
It was further stipulated that the Allied Reparation 
Commission, which was to supervise Germany's financial 
obligations, would inform Germany 
1921. The politicians had managed 
how much she owed by 1 May 
to defer their election 
promises of fantastic sums, while in the long-run this move 
was more disastrous for the 
might have been. Investors 
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German 
would 
economy than anything else 
be forced to think twice 
before sinking their money into a country with an unknown, and 
possibly tremendous, indemnity.104 The German delegation 
(in vi ted to Versailles after all this had been decided) was 
given the chance to propose its own figure, to which it 
replied with five billion pounds as a possible maximum. This 
figure, however, was subject to such qualifications as the 
retention of Germany's colonies and foreign assets and a 
number of technical loopholes that would have reduced the 
amount to be paid to practically nothing. The German proposal 
was, quite obviously, rejected. Lloyd George secured the 
right for Germany to submit within four months of the signing 
of the peace any proposals she might have regarding methods of 
payment. The Germans never made any such proposal after the 
Allied rejection of the aforementioned scheme.105 Pending the 
determination of total liability in May 1921, Germany was 
required to make a one billion pound down payment, less the 
expenses of the Allied armies of occupation and supplies of 
food and raw materials deemed essential for Germany to meet 
her reparations requirements.106 With this, Germany had to 
wait twenty-three months in anticipation of the worst. 
Beside the territorial and reparation provisions, the 
Treaty of Versailles contained numerous other punitive 
clauses. We have already seen some of the provisions for the 
disarmament of Germany: the abolition of conscription, the 
limiting of the army to one hundred thousand men, the 
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prohibition on the production of offensive weapons, and the 
limitations imposed upon the navy. A German air force was 
also forbidden although, at the insistence of Wilson against 
the recommendation of the Aeronautical Commission of the 
Conference, Germany would be allowed to maintain a civil 
aviation. The disarmament of Germany's armed forces was to be 
supervised by Inter-Allied Commissions of Control. Arti.:;:le 
227 accused the former German emperor of "a supreme offense 
against international morality" and the .Allies sought to bring 
him to trial for it. The Nether lands steadfastly refused to 
surrender the exiled emperor from his neutral asylum in Doorn, 
however, and nothing ever became of it. Article 228 carried 
this charge to all persons involved in German war atrocities. 
Ultimately, twelve persons were accused and tried by the 
German Supreme Court at Leipzig and they were all either 
acquitted or given very light sentences.107 
Perhaps no aspect of the Treaty of Versailles embittered 
the Germans more than the infamous "war-guilt clause," Article 
231, by which: 
the Allied and Associated Governments affirm 
and Germany accepts the responsibility of 
Germany and her allies for causing all the 
loss and damage to which the Allied and 
Associated Governments and their nationals 
have been subjected as a consequence of the 
war imposed upon them bl the aggression of 
Germany and her allies. 08 
The wording of this article, which preceded the reparations 
clauses of the treaty, was nearly identical to that of the 
Lansing Note- " ... By it they understand that compensation will 
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be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian 
population of the Allies, and their property, by the 
aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air."109 
The German government had accepted the principles of the Note 
as a basis to enter into armistice negotiations. Article 231 
was merely an extension of the Note, drafted by John Foster 
Dulles, then a member of the Reparation Commission, and was 
intended as a compromise between the American and Allied 
viewpoints. It established the potential extent of German 
liability (what Germany could pay) before limiting the 
financial liability (what Germany should pay).110 Thus, the 
article represented the American argument that Germany could 
not pay for the entire cost of the war, while allowing Lloyd 
George and Clemenceau to satisfy their electorates by 
establishing Germany's theoretical responsibility.111 In 
fact, the financial consequences of the article amounted to 
nothing since Article 232 limited German responsibility to 
civilian damage only.112 Norman Davis, an American 
representative, stated the meaning of 
clearly: "It can be said that Germany is 
Article 2 31 most 
morally responsible 
for the war and all the consequences thereof, and legally that 
she is responsible in accordance with the formula adopted for 
damage to property and persons." 113 The word 
once mentioned in this clause, and it was 
"guilt" is 
only later 
German propagandists began to sound off about war-guilt. 
not 
that 
Once all the terms of the Treaty had been "agreed" upon, 
a German delegation was finally invited to Versailles on 18 
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April 1919. To their consternation, the Germans discovered 
that they had come to Versailles not to bargain, but to have a 
diktat imposed upon them. To add insult to injury, Clemenceau 
had secured the right to preside over the ceremony on 7 May 
during which the draft treaty was communicated to the German 
Foreign Minister, Count Brockdorff -Rantzau. If he could not 
have a disunited Germany or a French-controlled Rhineland, 
then Clemenceau made sure that he would at least be able to 
impose a peace upon the Germans in the very same hall where 
the victorious Prussians had humiliated the French in 1871.114 
Clemenceau stood and addressed the German Foreign Minister: 
You see before you the accredited 
representatives of the Allied and 
Associated powers, both small and great, 
which have waged without intermission 
for more than four years the pitiless 
war which was imposed on them. The 
hour has struck for the weighty 
settlement of our accounts. You 
asked us for peace. We are disposed 
to grant it to you.115 
To which Brockdorff-Rantzau replied (seated- a very great 
discourtesy): 
We know the force of the hatred which 
confronts us here, and we have heard 
the passionate demand that the victors 
should both make us pay as vanquished 
and punish us as guilty. We are 
required to admit that we alone are 
war-guilty; such an admission on my 
lips would be a lie.116 
The fact that this reply was made sitting down angered many of 
the representatives present, above all Wilson, who remarked 
"What abominable manners ... The Germans are really a stupid 
people. They always do the wrong thing ... This is the most 
tactless speech I have ever 
world against them."ll7 
That was not to 
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heard. 
be the 
It wiil set the whole 
case, however. Upon 
Brockdorff-Rantzau's rejection of the terms, the German 
delegation was given twenty-two days in which to present their 
own observations on the draft terms; they argued quite 
cogently that "the exactions 
German people can bear" and 
of this treaty are more than the 
that the Fourteen Points, which 
the .Germans had agreed to 
been forfeited.ll8 The 
make peace upon, 
Germans were not 
appeared 
alone in 
to have 
their 
arguments. The British also felt that the Treaty had become 
excessively demanding, and during the next several weeks Lloyd 
George was able to maneuver the French and Americans into 
granting several 
agreed to in 
modifications of 
concessions to the Germans. A plebiscite was 
Upper 
the 
S i les ia, which resulted in further 
Polish frontier in Germany's favor. The 
"Upper Silesian question" had remained one of Germany's chief 
concerns, as a Wilsonian application of self-determination to 
the region would have meant the cession of the resource-richer 
areas to 
admission 
Poland. While 
of Germany to 
failing to secure the immediate 
the League of Nations, for which 
Germany had been willing to surrender the rest of her navy, 
Lloyd George was able to ensure that she would be admitted 
sometime in "the early future." 
evacuate the Rhineland earlier 
Further, the French agreed to 
than the stipulated fifteen 
years so 
Finally, 
long as Germany met her obligations in good faith. 
the Germans were permitted in their observations to 
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submit a proposal for reparations; we have already seen that 
they did not avail themselves of this boon. There were also 
several minor concessions, including further modification of 
the Pomeranian frontier in Germany 1 s favor, the purchase of 
Silesian coal, and the rate of German disarmament.ll9 
These concessions had been resisted by both the 
Americans and the French. Wilson complained that the British 
had done a double take and now feared the "things that they 
insisted upon at the time of the writing of the treaty; that 
makes me very sick ... They are all unanimous, if you please, in 
their funk. Nmv that makes me very tired."120 The President 
had become decidedly anti-German as the Conference had 
progressed. 
(" ... they are 
He agreed 
hard- but 
that 
the 
the Treaty 1 s terms were harsh 
Germans earned that"), but not 
unwarranted in light of what had necessitated them. What 
mattered most to Wilson was that the Treaty of Versailles 
should be just, and in looking upon a German state which, in 
his mind, had been the most nefarious of the belligerents, he 
found it to be so- "invariably my thought goes back to the 
very great offense against civilization which the German state 
committed and the necessity for making it evidence once and 
for all that such things can lead only to the most severe 
punishment."l21 
Regarding Anglo-French relations, Lloyd George 1 s push 
for further concessions to the Germans was the proverbial 
straw that broke the camel 1 s back. Disputes over the 
territorial and financial provisions of the Treaty had 
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strained the British and French alliance to its limits; this 
final yield by the British pushed it over 
fifteen year old Entente Cordi ale was dead. 
been wary of British intentions throughout 
the edge and the 
The French had 
the proceedings, 
recognizing that Britain's initially strong position would 
urge her to seek more lenient terms for Germany, perhaps even 
to the detriment of France. Clemenceau was already being 
attacked by critics at home for having been too "soft" on the 
Germans. Not only had the Treaty conceded too much to 
Germany, but France still did not appear to have been relieved 
of her 
British 
dangerous 
drive to 
security problems. 
concede even more to 
In French eyes, the 
the defeated Germany 
made them appear not only pro-German, but anti-French. 
The Allies responded to the German observations, with 
the aforementioned concessions, on 16 June, informing the 
German government that it had seven days in which to accept 
the revised draft. Failing a reply, the Allies planned to 
·advance thirty-nine divisions up the valley of the Main and 
sever southern from northern Germany. 
take action upon 
P.M. on 23 June.122 
the expiration 
There followed 
of 
a 
Foch was authorized to 
the armistice at 7:00 
crisis in the German 
government. Scheidemann declared: "What hand would not wither 
that would sign such a treaty! n123 The German Minister of 
War, Reinhardt, called a meeting of the generals at Weimar, 
announcing that it was his intention to lead a revolution in 
eastern Germany should the cabinet decide to accept the peace 
terms. No such action ever occurred, but the debate over the 
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peace terms caused the Scheidemann government to resign.124 A 
new government . was formed under Gustav Bauer, and on 22 June 
it offered to sign the Treaty under specific reserve regarding 
Articles 227-231, which dealt with "war-guilt" and the 
surrender of German war criminals. The Allies rejected this 
offer and on the morning of 23 June they refused to grant the 
Germans a forty-eight hour extension. The fact that, two days 
prior, the Germans had scuttled their battle-fleet interned at 
Scapa Flow had hardened 
At 5:00 that 
the Allies against any further 
deliberations. afternoon, a note was delivered 
to the Supreme Council conveying German willingness to sign, 
under compulsion, a dishonorable peace,125 "yielding 
overwhelming force."126 
to 
The two members of the German delegation, never allowed 
to sit with the Allied delegates at the table and escorted in 
and out of the Hall of Mirrors by armed escorts, signed the 
Treaty of Versailles at twelve minutes past three on the 
afternoon of 28 June 1919; United States Secretary of State 
Robert Lansing wrote: "It was as if men were being called 
upon to sign their death-warrants ... With pallid faces and 
trembling hands they wrote their names quickly and were then 
conducted back to their places."127 It was five years to the 
day since Gavrilo Princip had assassinated the all but 
forgotten Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo.128 
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IV. FROM SPA TO THE RUHR, 1920-1923. 
The conclusion of the Treaty- of Versailles on 28 June 
1919 was by no means the end of the financial and political 
difficulties between France, Great Britain and 
Rather, it was only the beginning, and the Treaty 
those problems which were to continue to vex 
affairs throughout the first half of the 1920's. 
Germany. 
codified 
European 
For the 
moment, Versailles had brought to an end the conflict 
between great armies; the deferment of the reparations issue 
until 1921 and the resentment aroused by the territorial and 
disarmament clauses of Versailles, however, ensured that the 
terms of the Treaty would never be laid to rest until these 
ongoing imbroglios were dealt with definitively. 
The history of French, British and German relations 
from the signing of the Treaty of Versailles until the Ruhr 
Crisis of 1923 may be reduced to several themes: the 
efforts by France (and 
enforce the strict 
her junior partners :j_n the east) to 
provisions of Versailles; Germany's 
attempts 
attempts 
to circumvent those provisions; and Britain's 
to restore the continental balance of power, 
primarily through eliminating those aspects of the Treaty 
which prevented Germany 
the system of European 
Versailles.129 
from either rejoining or accepting 
order as had been established at 
Shortly after the war's end, Clemenceau visited Lloyd 
George in the House of Commons and was asked if he had 
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anything 
to tell 
to say: 
you that 
"Yes indeed! " he responded, "I have come 
from the very day after the Armistice I 
found you 
replied: 
an enemy to France." To which Lloyd George 
traditional "Well, was it not always our 
policy?"130 This little episode between the two Prime 
Ministers aptly reflected the sentiments Britain and France 
felt for one another in the years immediately following the 
war. . Although Britain was almost certainly not out to 
destroy France, she did not appear to be looking to fortify 
her financial and strategic position either. British policy 
was directed toward restoring the continental balance of 
power and resuming her pre-war trading patterns. The 
realization of these interests was, in part, being hindered 
Treaty. The Treaty's by several provisions of the 
disarmament clauses ensured that France would become the 
preponderant military power on the continent, thus 
eliminating any chance of a restoration of the balance, 
while its vague financial terms contained the implication 
that Germany was going to be in no condition to buy any 
substantial amount of British products for an indefinite 
period of time. Both of these interests were deemed vi tal 
to Britain's well-being, and any obstacles to their 
realization had to be removed. 
Once again, this was bound to start trouble with the 
French and their insatiable appetite for security. French 
policy dictated that Germany never again be capable of 
launching an invasion across the Rhine. The partition of 
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Germany had not been possible; the next best 
to be strict adherence to the punitive terms 
of Versailles. A German state which was 
step appeared 
of the Treaty 
forbidden from 
arming the Rhineland, from having a mi 1 i tary of any 
consequence, and saddled with a tremendous indemnity would 
never be a threat to a France determined to remain armed to 
the teeth and who was supported by a number of allies who 
shared her desire to keep Germany weak. Thus, while Britain 
sought to revise the terms of Versailles in Germany 1 s favor 
(and to her own advantage), France, for her own well-being, 
demanded obedience to the letter. 
The Germans had neither revision nor adherence on their 
minds. For this vanquished people, the only questions were 
how soon and by what means could the Treaty of Versailles be 
dismantled. An armed response was, for the moment, out of 
the question. The peaceful 
might meant eluding the 
clandestinely fortifying the 
Even the Weimar government, 
pursuit of rebuilding 
heavy reparations 
miniaturized armed 
German 
while 
forces. 
many of. whose officials worked 
in earnest to establish democracy in Germany, never 
seriously seemed to believe that Germany was destined to be 
forever after a second-rank power; the German High Command 
would see to that. 
By November 1919, France 1 s hopes for an Anglo-American 
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military guarantee to her security were dashed. That month, 
the United States Senate had twice voted on ratification of 
the Treaty of Versailles and twice defeated it. The defeat 
had been orchestrated by two groups in the Senate: The 
so-called "Irreconcilables," a group of sixteen senators who 
were not prepared to accept the Treaty of Versailles under 
any terms, and by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and his supporters, the 
"Strong Reservationists." The elections of November 1918, 
which had brought a Republican majority to both the Senate 
and the House, had foreshadowed the difficulties which 
Wilson was going to face in getting the American people and 
their elected representatives to accept his new world order. 
The President believed that with the establishment of a 
League of Nations, the world might finally be freed from the 
Hobbesian s ·tate of international anarchy. Article X of the 
Covenant, which called upon League members "to protect and 
preserve as against external aggression the territorial 
integrity and existing political independence of all members 
of the League," was designed to create a system of 
collective security, in which the concert of nations banded 
together to protect their own. Wilson had fought to ensure 
that the Covenant of the 
every treaty 
including the 
discussed 
concluded 
Treaty 
of the some 
getting the European 
League of Nations was written into 
during the Paris Peace Conference, 
of Versailles. We have already 
difficulties 
Allies to 
Wilson encountered in 
accept his newfangled 
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scheme. He also encountered problems at home, from the more 
conservative elements who were not altogether willing to 
allow the United States to play such an active role in world 
affairs . In order to appease them, he was forced to include 
within the Covenant reservations which allowed for members 
to withdraw from the League, exempted home politics from the 
League's jurisdiction, and which ensured that "regional 
like the Monroe understandings 
breached.130 
In both Europe and America, the 
viewed with wary eyes. Clemenceau 
Doctrine" were not 
League of Nations was 
and Foch of France had 
sought only an American military guarantee to the Treaty, 
not some universal system to which all powers belonged and 
were sworn to defend one another against armed aggression. 
The British were more conciliatory (perhaps because the 
original idea for 
Walter Phillimore 
a League had been that of two Englishmen, 
and Lord Robert Cecil), although Lloyd 
George and others had reservations concerning obligations to 
go to war on behalf of any member. Senator Cabot Lodge 
seemed to have shared the views of the Allies that nations 
almost always eschew war except when their vi tal interests 
are at stake. Great Powers could not be expected to enforce 
the League's decisions unless the issue was directly related 
to the concerns of the powers.131 
By September 1919, Lodge and his supporters had 
affirmed their willingness to accept the Treaty of 
Versailles, without the League of Nations. Subsequently, in 
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a tremendous concession to the President, they stated their 
willingness to accept American membership of the League 
providing that the Congress had the authority to evaluate 
each crisis which called upon American armed forces. This 
commitment would have allowed for American participation in 
a multilateral alliance without bypassing the Congress' 
constitutional authority to declare war. Wilson demanded 
all-or-nothing, however: "Either we should enter the League 
fearlessly, accepting the responsibility and not fearing the 
role of leadership which we now enjoy ... or we should retire 
great concert of powers as gracefully as possible from the 
by which the world was saved."132 
The President embarked on an eight thousand mile rail 
trip to convince the American people he was right. On 25 
September- he suffered a stroke in his private rail car (he 
had already suffered a first stroke in Paris in April); it 
was covered up and after a speech in Pueblo, Colorado, he 
collapsed. Upon returning to Washington, there came a 
third, massive stroke which paralyzed the left side of his 
body and left him bedridden f6r the remainder of his 
life.133 The League of Nations proved too much of a breach 
with the long-standing tradition of isolationism for both 
the American people and the 
twice defeated the Treaty on 
Congress to bear. The Senate 
19 November 1919 and again on 
19 March 1920. Technically, America was to remain at war 
with Germany until 11 November 1921 when both Germany and 
the United States ratified the Treaty of Berlin, by which 
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the United States was accorded all the rights given to the 
signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, without any of the 
military or political responsibilities assigned to the 
European powers.134 
The subsequent Republican administrations 
Coolidge and Warren G. Harding continued 
under Calvin 
the American 
political and military 
European powers with a 
retreat from Europe, leaving the 
League they had never asked for and 
France in particular with a military guarantee which was now 
nothing more than a 11 scrap of paper. 11 With the British 
ready to withdraw from ·continental affairs, France became 
the only Allied power remaining on the continent to enforce 
the Treaty of Versailles. 
Left to go it alone, France did what she could to 
replace her former military partners by concluding several 
alliances with a number of small to medium sized states 
across the continent. France's efforts to bolster the 
Eastern European 
at Versailles 
successor states had already been assisted 
by the Wilsonian principle of 
self-determination. The acquisition of German territory by 
smaller states like Poland and Czechoslovakia ensured that 
they would be future objects of German hostility, if and 
when Germany was strong enough to come looking for what was 
once hers. Fear of German retribution was reason enough for 
these states to seek protection in Paris. 
In September 1920 France concluded a military alliance 
with tiny Belgium; though Belgium's territorial acquisitions 
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at versailles had been insignificant (the districts of Eupen 
and Malmedy on the German frontier), they were sti 11 enough 
to ensure German resentment. Moreover, Belgium was located 
directly along Germany's historic invasion route into 
France. Geographical misfortune and territorial acquisition 
rendered Belgium a prime candidate for future German 
hostilities.135 
In the east, the recently reconstituted state of Poland 
became the focus of French alliance overtures. Poland, a 
hybrid of former Russian, German and Austrian territories, 
became an independent republic on 3 November 1918 and, 
thanks to the Treaty of Versailles and Wilson's Fourteen 
Points, had acquired large sections of West Prussia and 
Posen, as well as special economic privileges in the Baltic 
port city of Danzig.136 Poland's designs for Upper Silesia, 
a region which happened to harbor Germany's largest coal 
reserves and which we have already discussed in relation to 
the territorial provisions of Versailles, were to spark not 
only ardent German resentment but rigorous 
British, who were weary of French attempts 
domination in the region.137 
protest from the 
to assure Polish 
The Upper Silesian plebiscite which Lloyd George had 
insisted upon as a concession to Germany took place on 20 
March 1921. The British, by that time, had become convinced 
of the complete lack of impartiality of the French Chairman 
of the Allied Plebiscite Commission, General Le Rond, who 
had tolerated the subversive activities of the Polish agent 
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Wojciech Korfanty and his armed bands. British influence in 
the region was minimal, however, due to the absence of 
British troops and the overwhelming number of French forces 
in the area, and they were unable to secure the recall of Le 
Rond or the removal of Korfanty. The plebiscite recorded 
seven hundred thousand votes for Germany to four hundred and 
eighty thousand for Poland. The Polish government insisted 
that all those regions with a Polish majority must go to 
Poland, even if that meant taking towns that contained a 
majority of German-speaking 
of these towns happened 
industrial regions. The 
citizens. Coincidentally, many 
to be located in the primary 
British advocated leaving the 
industrial area to Germany, while Le Rond supported the 
Poles. The British and French debated a resolution until 
August; in the intervening time, Polish units under Korfanty 
had been engaged in combat with irregular German units 
throughout Upper Silesia. Eventually, it was decided that 
the issue should be submitted to the League, which in 
October 1921 partitioned the industrial sector between the 
Germans and Poles. The Upper Silesian dispute served to 
broaden the growing gap between Britain 
aroused German hostility toward Poland.138 
German revenge, Warsaw was predisposed 
and France and 
Fearing future 
to conclude a 
military alliance with France on 19 February 1921, which was 
followed by a large influx of French capital for armaments 
and reconstruction.139 
France also sought to ally itself with the so-called 
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Little Entente- Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia- all 
from the defeated three of which 
These 
had acquired lands 
Hungary. three states had concluded bilateral 
military alliances between one another in the hopes of 
deterring any future attempt by Hungary to reacquire its 
lost territories. The French government anticipated that in 
concluding a military alliance with Czechoslovakia, the only 
member of the Little Entente to share a common frontier with 
Germany, she could draw in the rest of the Entente. The 
three million German-speaking citizens in the Sudetenland, 
which Czechoslovakia had acquired at Versailles, alongside 
Germany's resentment over having lost the region, compelled 
the Czechs to reach an accord with Paris on 25 January 1924, 
which called for mutual assistance in the event of 
unprovoked aggression; France 
military alliances with Romania 
Yugoslavia on 11 November 1927.140 
While this newly-formed bloc 
subsequently 
on 10 June 
of French 
concluded 
1926 and 
allies on 
Germany's eastern front appeared formidable on a map, it was 
not a worthy successor to France's traditional Russian 
alliance. The cluster of states stretching from the Baltic 
to the Balkans lacked Russia's seemingly infinite supply of 
manpower with which to throw against Germany's eastern 
front. Moreover, these successor states were no more than 
multinational hodge 
minorities thrown 
podges, with 
into regions 
large groups of ethnic 
that were anything but 
melting pots. Centrifugal forces constituted a persistent 
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threat to the central political authority of many of these 
states. Compounding these difficulties was the fact that 
Poland and every member of the Little Entente had been 
involved in one form or another of the land-grabbing orgy 
which occurred after the collapse of the Central European 
Empires at war's end. Ofttimes, they were engaged in blo.ody 
warfare against one another or with an outside power such as 
Russia or Italy, with the effect of eroding their own 
national stability and poisoning French aspirations for a 
united anti-German bloc in the east.141 
The French were, of course, prevented from reforming 
their Russian alliance 
discussed. The recent 
for reasons 
establishment of 
we have already 
the Comintern (the 
Communist Inte.rnational, a Russian Marxist organization 
dedicated to spreading the gospel according to Marx 
throughout Europe) in March 1919 did nothing to allay the 
French fears of the growing French communist party and its 
dedication to the Marxist doctrine of social revolution. 
Nor had the French government forgotten Lenin's repudiation 
of the tremendous financial debt owed it by the fallen 
czarist regime. Geographical 
Russian alliance difficult: 
conditions 
Russia no 
also made the old 
longer shared a 
common frontier with Germany. The Treaty of Brest-Li tovsk 
had stripped Russia of her European holdings of Finland, the 
Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia), Poland, the 
Ukraine, and the provinces of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan). The Treaty 
Transcaucasia (Georgia, 
of Riga with Poland had 
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further aggrandized that state's eastern boundaries at 
Russia's expense; and the Treaty of Bucharest with Romania 
deprived Russia of the province of Bessarabia. Even if the 
French had been able to conclude a military pact with 
Russia, it was very unlikely that any of these smaller 
states lying in between Russia and Germany would allow, with 
any hope of retaining their territorial gains, Russian 
troo~s to para~e on former Russian soil.142 
In the west, the French army, which occupied the 
southern sector of the Rhineland, had set about establishing 
itself as a conqueror in a hostile environment.143 
in Cologne, 
and it was 
Contrarily, the British, who were headquartered 
got along charmingly with the German citizens, 
frequently remarked "that the British soldier found the 
company of his ex-enemies more congenial than that of his 
ex-allies." 144 A number of incidents in the French sector 
were to antagonize Anglo-French post-war relations. 
In March 1920, the German government had requested 
Allied permission to send 
suppress a left-wing uprising 
more troops into the Ruhr to 
which had been precipitated by 
the so-called Kapp Putsch of that same month. This affair 
arose out of the Allied demand 
reduced to one hundred thousand 
that 
men. 
the 
In 
German army be 
accordance with 
this demand, the Weimar government tried to dissolve the 
Freikorps which had fought the Spartacists in 1919. When 
the government began the process of demobilization, however, 
the commandant of Ber 1 in, General Walther Lu tt wi tz, ordered 
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two divisions to advance on the city. On the morning of 13 
March, the 
government 
troops entered Berlin 
under Dr. Wolfgang Kapp. 
and 
The 
proclaimed a new 
Ebert government, 
whose Chief of Staff, General von Seeckt, refused mi 1 i tary 
resistance, declaring "troops do not fire on troops ... When 
Reichswehr fires on Reichswehr, then all comradeship within 
the officer corps has vanished",145 was forced to flee 
Berlin. The Putsch was not quelled by local army officers 
but by a general strike called for by the Socialists and the 
trade unions. Order was restored by 17 March, but not 
before leaving the lingering suspicion that the German army 
was becoming a state within a state, setting its mvn agenda 
and pursuing its own policies, regardless of whether or not 
it had the Weimar government's approval.146 
Following the Kapp Putsch, the French ;-rere unwilling to 
tolerate any further German military activity in the Ruhr. 
They proposed that the Allied armies of occupation restore 
order in the unruly regions and proceed to seize other parts 
of German terri tory to guarantee that German troops would 
eventually evacuate the Ruhr. The British disagreed and, 
once again, while the two powers were debating which course 
of action 
Outraged, 
Darmstadt, 
to 
the 
take, German 
French seized 
troops engaged in combat. 
the towns of Frankfurt and 
against British object ions; the French made it 
quite clear that they were prepared to use armed force, 
alone if necessary, to enforce the provisions of Versailles: 
"Do (sic) not [the] British government measure [the] danger 
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of these successive and systematic violations? When will 
they call a halt to Germany? If they do not do so France 
must." 147 The matter was concluded when French officials, 
somewhat subdued, promised not to act again without previous 
Allied agreement.148 
Another divisive issue between the Allies was the 
so-called "black shame," 
propagandists. The French 
which was 
employed 
harped upon by German 
a number of Algerian 
troops in the Rhineland occupation. The Germans made a case 
of deliberate humiliation imposed upon the German citizens 
of the Rhineland by the stationing of colored troops in the 
French sector, and there were dubious reports in the press 
about acts of rape and pilferage. The British and Americans 
sided with the Germans and demanded that the colored troops 
be withdrawn. This 
German fabrication, 
incident, which was probably a complete 
caused the British and Americans to 
perceive the French occupation force as being excessively 
cruel. 149 
Finally, the British were disturbed by 
encouragement of separatist movements 
During the military occupation of the 
throughout 
France's 
Germany. 
officials 
authority 
had urged the local 
to rid themselves of 
Rhine, certain French 
populations 
the Berlin 
under their 
government and 
proclaim an independent republic in the Rhineland. In the 
Palatinate during the fall of 1923, French officials 
recognized a separatist organization as an 
government in the Palatinate. The separatists, 
independent 
armed by the 
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French for this purpose, expelled the German officials and 
took over the local administration. 1924, the 
French and Belgian representatives of 
In January 
the High Commission 
voted, against the British, to recognize an autonomous 
government of the Palatinate.l50 The British government was 
furious and pressured Paris to call a halt to these "loose 
cannons" in the Palatinate. When the French acquiesced, 
riots broke out across the region and mobs lynched 
separatists before Allied troops could intervene. 
more was heard from the separatist movement 
Palatinate.151 
dozens of 
Nothing 
in the 
French maneuvering both east and west of Germany proved 
almost too much for the British government to tolerate, and 
if France had entertained thoughts of resuming cordial 
relations with Great Britain, she was going about it in a 
reckless fashion. France 1 s drive to find new allies 
throughout Europe, while concurrently eating away at German 
seen by British officials as an could only stability, 
attempt to dominate 
strategically. The 
be 
the continent both 
British overestimated 
financiaily and 
French strength. 
France may have possessed the strongest military contingent 
on the continent, but her eastern alliance system was 
questionable at best and her economy was rapidly weakening. 
But France 1 s continued insistence on fortifying her defenses 
would not allow Britain to extricate herself from 
continental affairs so that she might dedicate herself to 
global concerns. To make matters worse, the two powers were 
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resuming their old competition in the colonial world, most 
notably in the Middle-East. Anglo-French wrangling over 
minor territori~l disputes prompted Paul Cambon, French 
Ambassador in London, to write: "I do not believe in the 
possibility of a rupture but everywhere, on every point, 
there is disagreement and the misfortune is that neither in 
Paris nor in London are they intelligent enough to reduce 
the disagreements to the essential points and disregard the 
trifles. 
baubles. 
It is easier to settle the big questions than the 
But men ... only care about the baubles."152 
In November 1921, French Prime Minister Aristide 
Briand, who declared that France could not disarm physically 
until Germany disarmed morally,153 sought to negotiate a 
formal defensive alliance with Britain. Briand wanted a 
guarantee stronger than the one which had evaporated in 
1919, primarily through a British pledge to defend Poland 
and support France in maintaining · the demilitarized 
Rhineland zone.154 
Regarding a British commitment to the defense of 
Poland, the French argued that without this pledge: 
such an alliance, at the best would cover 
us, if not against another Charleroi, at 
least against a Sedan, but it would not 
cover us against a Polish Sad6wa, which, 
for Germany, would be the best preparation 
for another Sedan.155 
The French urged Great Britain to guarantee Polish security 
if she had any interest in preventing a third German 
offensive.156 Lloyd George's response to this French plea 
vividly illustrated Britain's attitude toward Eastern 
European security: 
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So far as the western frontier of Germany was concerned, 
it would be possible to give France complete guarantee 
against invasion. The British people were not very much 
interested in what happened on the . eastern frontier of 
Germany; they would not be ready to be involved in quarrels 
which might arise regarding Poland or . Danzig or Upper 
Silesia. On the contrary, there was general reluctance to 
get mixed up in these questions in any way. The British 
people felt that the populations in that quarter of Europe 
were unstable and excitable, they might start fighting at 
any time, and the rights and wrongs of the dispute might be 
very hard to disentangle. He did not think, therefore, that 
this country [i.e. Britain] would be disposed to give any 
guarantees which might involve them in military operations 
in any eventuality in that part of the world. On the other 
hand, he repeated, public opinion would readily give a 
guarantee against German attack on the soil of France.157 
Lloyd George made it clear that Great Britain was 
unwilling to defend the Treaty of Versailles as a whole. 
Moreover, she was not prepared to support France in her 
drive to promote strict adherence to the Treaty's 
provisions. If France sought to forin mi 1 i tary alliances 
with the intention of curbing German aggression in Eastern 
Europe, she would have to go that route alone. The British 
did propose their own treaty, which called for the 
signatories to "consult together should any breach be 
threatened" regarding the demilitarized Rhineland. Briand 
insisted that any German breach of any of the mi 1 i tary 
clauses of Versailles, including an assault in Eastern 
Europe, must be considered an act of aggression against 
France. Britain made it quite clear, however: Eastern 
Europe was out of the question.158 When the British sought 
to pursue a treaty on their own terms, French Prime Minister 
Raymond Poincare (Briand resigned upon failing to secure the 
British guarantee) responded rather coaly to a defensive 
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pact "to which, in the form presented to him, he added, he 
attached no importance whatever ... He considered it a 
mystification without any real value, since if circumstances 
arose such as had occurred in 1914 ... England, in her own 
interests, 
then."159 
will be obiiged to take 
The new Anglo-French military 
the same action as 
alliance was a dead 
letter and, until 1924, the French chose to forsake British 
friendship for strict enforcement of the Treaty. British 
cooperation was an aspiration, but the French were ready to 
go without it.160 
France's political and strategic maneuvering contrived 
to keep Germany weak on all fronts represented one part of 
the difficulties encountered in reestablishing stable Great 
Power relations throughout the first half of the 1920's. 
Other difficulties arose from the issue of reparations, and 
it was this aspect of French, British and German relations 
which sundered completely, at least until 1924, not only any 
hope of coercing Germany into accepting the provisions laid 
down at Versailles, but any possibility of fostering a sense 
of stabi 1 i ty as had existed in the decades prior to the 
outbreak of the Great War. 
Before launching a discussion of the financial 
imbroglios of the 1920's, we must focus for a moment on the 
economist who may have had the greatest influence over 
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financial philosophy throughout the period with which we are 
here concerned: John Maynard Keynes and his bitter assault 
of the Treaty of Versailles, The Economic Consequences of 
the Peace. 
Keynes had served as the Brit ish Treasury 
representative at Versailles until June when he resigned, 
disgusted with the proceedings at Paris. Keynes began The 
Economic Consequences by reviewing the great financial 
achievements in Europe throughout the nineteenth century. 
Europe had 
to support 
acquired not only a sufficient amount of capital 
a growing population at a higher standard of 
living, but it also exported vast amounts of capital to the 
rest of the world, thereby improving the economy of the 
world over.161 
The war had ended all that, however: 11 A great part of 
the continent was sick and dying; its population was greatly 
in excess of the numbers for which a livelihood was 
available; its organization 
system disrupted, and 
was 
its 
destroyed, its 
food supplies 
transport 
terribly 
impaired. 11 162 Keynes argued that the reparations clauses of 
Versailles would serve only to increase the economic 
dislocation created by the Great War. This view had been 
shared by many British and American financial 
Paris. Before the war, the amount of German 
habitually larger than exports; this export 
experts at 
imports 
deficit 
was 
was 
balanced by 11 invisible exports, 11 payments made by foreigners 
for the use of German shipping, for interest on German 
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investments abroad, for insurance premiums, etc. But the 
loss of her colonies, merchant . marine, a sizable portion of 
her industrial sector, the depreciation of the mark, and the 
turbulent domestic situation implied that Germany was going 
to face a great deal of difficulty in making payments 
abroad. Until the German financial and political situation 
was stabilized, there was no chance of her making good on 
the fabulous reparation payments that were to be asked of 
her. The popular belief that Germany might be able to pay 
several times that was a fallacy, for payment must come f~om 
the surplus generated by exports, which needed markets to be 
sold in. What specific commodity, Keynes demanded, did the 
Allies intend payment to be made in and in what markets were 
the goods to be sold?163 
Keynes found the failure of the Allies to solve the 
issue of inter-Allied debts . as 
preposterous reparations settlement. 
disastrous as 
By war's end, 
the 
the 
total 
twenty 
figure for intergovernmental 
billion dollars, of which 
debts was approximately 
ten billion was owed to 
America arid nine billion to Britain. Some of these debts 
might be repaid, but Russia had ensured that four billion 
dollars was not going to be repaid and several other 
financially questionable states were also unlikely to pay 
anything .164 He argued that the payments being asked of 
Germany were based "not on any reasonable calculation of 
what Germany can, in fact, pay, but on a well-founded 
appreciation of the unbearable financial situation in which 
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these countries will find themselves unless she pays.••165 
This implied that a viable reparation settlement could be 
found only in connection with the settlement of war debts. 
Many Allied leaders felt this to be true but, again, their 
electorates were demanding that Germany pay. Wilson refused 
to link war debts and reparations, Lloyd George argued that 
Britain must receive her fair share of reparations, even if 
that meant generating an unfeasible settlement, and 
Clemenceau knew that no figure, no matter how high, was ever 
going to please his French electorate.166 
Keynes blasted the Big Three for not realizing "that 
the most serious of the problems which claimed their 
attention were 
and economic, 
frontiers or 
not political or territorial but financial 
and . that the perils of the future lay not in 
sovereignties but in food, coal and 
transport." 167 Wilson's idealism, Lloyd George's 
opportunism, and Clemenceau's reactionism had 
political 
served to 
create not only an unworkable Treaty, but a warped system of 
international relations in which "An inefficient, 
unemployed, disorganized Europe faces us, torn by internal 
strife and international hate, fighting, starving, pillaging 
and lying." 168 If peace were ever to be restored, then it 
must come through a revision of the Treaty; reparations must 
be scaled down, war debts canceled, inflation halted, 
industry revived by an international loan, and a great free 
trade union composed of Germany and all the successor states 
must be established under the aegis of the League.169 
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TABLE 1. Natiaoa1 ~. Popu1atian, and Per capita Incanp of tbe 
Powers in 1914. 
N:ltirnal In:rne R:pllatim Fer capita Irmre 
a. l.E'A. $37 billim 98 millim $377 
b. Bd.tain 11 45 244 
c. Fran::E 6 39 153 
d. Japm 2 55 36 
e. Cemsny 12 65 184 
f. Italy 4 37 100 
g. Russia 7 171 41 
h. Aus. --H.nJ. 3 52 57 
TABLE 2. war Ex::p>nditures and 'l'ota1 M:>bi1ized Forces, 1914-1919. 
W:rr Exfa!litur'EE (1913 priCES) 'Ibtal M:bilizErl Fon::Es 
9.5 mi.llim a. Bd.t. Ehp. $23.0 billim 
b. Fran::E 9.3 
c. Russia 5.4 
d. Italy 3.2 
e. l.E'A. 17.1 
f. OtlEr Allies* -.3 
Allierl 'lbtal 57.7 
h. Cemsny 19.9 
i. Aus. --H.1r:g. 4. 7 
j . B.J.lgaria 
& '1\.n:Xey .1 
'Ibtal 
Cent.~ 24.7 
8.2 
13.0 
5.6 
3.8 
- 2.6 
L{). 7 
13.25 
9.00 
2.85 
25.10 
* :Eelgiun, Rurania, ~' GrEa:E arrl S=rbia. 
TABLE 3. Wor1d Indices of Manufacturing Production, 1913-1925. 
1913 1920 1925 
a. Wxld 100 93.6 121.6 
b. Elrrt::p:!* 100 77.3 103.5 
c. lR:R 100 12.8 70.1 
d. l.E'A. 100 122.2 148.0 
e. 'llE Imt 
of t:le Wxld 100 100.5 138.1 
* lhiterl :Kirg:bn, F:ran:E, :Eelgiun, N=t.l'Erlarrls, <Errrany, ll:mBrk, 8\oa:En, l\brway 
Finlarrl, Swit:zErlarrl, Austria, Italy, Cza:imlovakia, H.n;;;Jary, Iblarrl, R.mmia, 
Gre3:E, arrl Sprin. 
TABLE 4. Major Wartime and Postwar Foreign Loans of the 
united states Government (in millions of dollars). 
R:d.pient 
a. Bd.tain 
b. Fran::E 
c. Italy 
d. Russia 
e. :Eelgiun 
'Ibtal 
Pre-ArmistiCE (cash) 
$3,6%.0 
1,970.0 
1,031.0 
187.7 
171.8 
$7,056.5 
REt-ArmistiCE (cash & SUW· ) 'Ibtal 
$581.0 $4,277.0 
1,434.8 3,LK>4.8 
617.0 1,648.0 
4.9 192.6 
207.3 379.1 
$2,845.0 $9,901.5 
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Keynes's Economic Consequences hit home with deadly 
accuracy 1 for it said to many what they wanted to hear: 
that the Peace of Paris must be scrapped and something 
better must replace it. For America 1 it was extremely 
influential in pushing the Senate to disavow Wilson's pipe 
dream of a new world order based on an unworkable financial 
system. This did not I of course 1 change the fact that the 
Republican administrations which followed Wilson's were 
prepared to write off the debt owed the United States by the 
Allies. Nor did it imply that America was going to relax 
her policy of financial protectionism 1 which many American 
manufacturers had demanded so that their goods might not be 
threatened by the inf 1 ux of products that was sure to come 
once European manufacturing was up and running. Keynes's 
book served as a rude awakening to many British officials 
that large German reparations could not and should not be 
relied upon; suddenly the war debt to America lool<:ed as if 
it might exact a terrible toll upon the British economy. 
Rather than erasing German economic competition 1 it became 
apparent that British prosperity was going to depend upon a 
Germany capable of buying British industrial manufactures. 
The goal was no longer to wipe the Hun out I but to make 
conciliatory gestures toward him and encourage him to buy 
your products. The Germans may have been delighted by the 
sudden impact of Mr. Keynes; nearly everything he had to say 
was in theil b favor. It was perhaps in France where the 
seeds sown by The Economic Consequences of the Peace were 
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delayed in taking root. The imperative goal of security, no 
matter how much that pursuit might have conflicted with 
general European financial stability, took precedence over 
easing up on Germany.170 
At the Spa Conference in 1920, German and Allied 
delegates met for the first time at a table on equal terms. 
Most of the discussions there were taken up by debates over 
the size of German coal deliveries for the next six months, 
and the dispute was settled only after Allied military 
commanders had been summoned to prepare for a military 
invasion of Germany.171 At Spa, the Allies had decided, 
amongst themselves, the allocation percentages of the thus 
far non-existent German reparations: France was to receive 
fifty-two percent, the British Empire twenty-two percent, 
Italy ten percent, Belgi urn eight percent, and the remainder 
was to be distributed amongst the lesser Allies.172 The 
Germans had also presented their own plan for reparations, 
which led to discussions between Allied and German financial 
experts in Brussels in December 1920. In January 1921, this 
committee presented a reparations plan covering the next 
five years; the Germans were willing to accept it, but only 
on the condition that they be allowed to retain the whole of 
Upper Silesia. 173 
The French Prime and Foreign Minister Briand, viewing 
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Germany's apparent willingness to reach some terms of 
agreement, scrapped the Brussels Plan and began again at the 
Paris Conference of January 1921. Briand secured British 
approval of terms high enough to satisfy French public 
opinion, if only because Lloyd George was desperate to keep 
the more f lexib1e Briand in power and the intransigent 
factions out. Lloyd George stipulated that the terms must 
be approved by the Germans, and the Paris Plan was presented 
to the Germans as a set of negotiable propositions. Should 
an agreement fail to be reached at Par is, however, Lloyd 
George was willing, along with the French, to apply 
sanctions- probably military occupation. Bullying now 
seemed as valid a pretext as any to secure German 
approval.174 
At the London Conference of March 19 21, the Germans 
again rejected the Allied overtures for a final reparations 
settlement. If Br~ tain, and now France, were willing to 
demonstrate some leniency toward Germany, then Germany was 
certainly not helping them to help her. On 8 March, on the 
grounds of Germany's unwillingness to complete the initial 
down payment of five billion dollars imposed upon her at 
Versailles and to execute several of the disarmament 
provisions, Allied troops occupied the towns of 
Dui sburg and Ruhrort on the east bank of the 
German government still refused to accept 
Dusseldorf, 
Rhine. The 
the Paris 
reparation terms, and Briand threatened to occupy the entire 
Ruhr if accounts were not soon squared away.175 
On 27 
prescribed 
Commission 
April 1921, 
by the Treaty 
fixed Germany's 
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four days before the deadline 
of Versailles, the Reparation 
total liability at thirty-three 
billion dollars ($33,000,000,000). Germany was also found 
to be in default of her five billion down payment by some 
three billion dollars .1 76 On 5 May, after another 
conference in London, the Allies communicated to Germany a 
"schedule of payments," which was the mildest scheme for 
reparations yet devised. Again, the politicians had come to 
the conclusion 
utter in public: 
was capable of 
in private what they knew they could not 
Germany could be made to pay only what she 
paying and not a cent more. The "London 
Schedule" established Germany's theoretical indemnity; by no 
means did it prescribe what Germany actually would pay. On 
the surface, Briand had satisfied the demands of the French 
electorate for a heavy financial indemnity to be placed on 
Germany's head; for Lloyd George, anxious to reach a 
negotiated settlement with the Germans, it appeared as if a 
settlement had been reached from which Germany would be able 
to recover financially.177 
Germany was given six days in which to respond to this 
latest Allied communication; if the Germans did not respond, 
the Allies would occupy the Ruhr on 12 May.178 After yet 
another one of those brief cabinet crises which had become 
so commonplace in Weimar politics, the government under Karl 
Wirth accepted the Allied terms and by August Germany made 
her first cash installment of two hundred and fifty million 
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dollars; it was destined to be her last for the next three 
years. 178 The London Schedule divided the German debt into 
three parts, represented by three classes of bonds: II A I II 
"B," and "C." "A" totalled three billion dollars, "B" was 
nine and a half billion dollars, and "C" \vas twenty and a 
half billion dollars. The "C" bonds, which represented 
two-thirds 
Reparations 
established; 
of Germany's entire debt, were to be held by 
Commission until Germany's capacity to pay 
the theoretical debt had been established 
the 
was 
at 
thirty-three billion dollars, while in reality Germany had 
to pay "only" twelve and a half billion dollars. Of this 
remaining amount, Germany would be asked to pay five hundred 
million dollars per year in cash plus twenty-six percent of 
the value of her exports. Any payments in kind would be 
deducted from these figures.179 
The London Schedule of May 1921 had reduced Germany's 
financial indemnity to the point where she could, rather 
easily, have met the reparations bill imposed upon her \vi th 
only a moderate reduction in domestic consumption.180 The 
"C" bonds, which represented the bulk of Germany's debt, 
were to be placed on the shelf until some remote time in the 
future when the "A" and "B" bonds had been liquidated. The 
Germans remained dissatisfied, however; to the German 
people, the republican 
this settlement under 
While this was true, 
as mild a treatment 
government had been forced to accept 
the threat of armed intervention. 
the London Schedule represented about 
as Germany could ever have hoped to 
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achieve. Any amount of reparations however, no matter how 
small, was deemed unjust 
people could not accept the 
they certainly could not 
pay for it.181 
by most Germans. If the German 
fact that they had lost the war, 
accept the fact that they had to 
The reparations problem was far from being solved, 
however, as were the lingering difficulties arising from 
inter-Allied war debts. The London Schedule probably 
represented the final period of financial accord between 
London and Paris until 1924; the intervening years were to 
be marked by severe difficulty in European national finances 
and with the Americans, who were beginning to become 
impatient for the return of their money. Apparently, 
neither Keynes's book nor that French and British demands 
that the United States write the money off as its commitment 
to the war effort convinced the American creditors that they 
should kiss their money goodbye. 
In February 1922, the United States Congress appointed 
a World War Foreign Debt Commission, charged with collecting 
the ten billion dollars owed to the American Treasury by 
1947, with an interest rate of not less than four and a half 
percent. During the Great War, Britain had acted as broker 
for the European Allies, contracting heavy debts from the 
American banker on their behalf.182 When the American's 
came knocking on the Bank of England's door, the British 
issued the so-called Balfour Note of 1 August 1922, 
reminding their former wartime partners that, excluding 
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interest, they collectively owed Great Britain roughly one 
billion three hundred million pounds; she was also owed some 
six hundred and fifty million pounds in repudiated Russian 
debts and one billion four hundred fifty million pounds 
entitled to her through German reparations.183 
This tactful bit of British diplomacy informed the 
Allies that Great Brita in would, of course, have preferred 
to refrain from asking for any payments, if only the 
Americans had not insisted upon collecting their money. The 
British government had still been willing to cancel all 
debts owed to it, as well as 
in "one great transaction."184 
its 
This 
own share of reparations, 
British proposal was 
received poorly in both the United States and France. The 
American Congress was unwilling to raise domestic taxes in 
order to cancel the debt on the European taxpayers behalf. 
The Allies resisted the American demand for the initiation 
of repayment schedules with several cogent arguments. To 
the previously mentioned point regarding American 
repudiation of loans as her sacrifice to the war effort, the 
Allies informed the American government that the proceeds 
from these loans had been spent almost entirely in the 
United States. The sale of mass quanti ties of American 
products had benefited the American economy all-around. In 
addition, there was the Keynesian argument that the American 
cancellation of debts would be to everybody's advantage; a 
prosperous, financially heal thy Europe was bound to import 
American goods, thereby increasing American profits. Rather 
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than pumping money into regions which desperately needed it, 
the Americans were demanding that Europe pump money into the 
American financial powerhouse with debt payments which were 
going to strain continental economies to the point of 
breaking. Finally, the rapid growth of American 
protectionism immediately following the 
European firms from selling to 
could not sell, they could 
the 
not 
American 
war preempted 
marJcet; if they 
accumulate the dollars 
necessary for repayment. But the Americans were living down 
a one-way street; President Calvin Coolidge, a man noted for 
his sparing use of words, remarked "They hired the money, 
didn't they? "185 This correctly characterized the American 
attitude toward debt repayment. 
The French demanded that war-debts and reparations be 
closely linked, calling for the United States to either 
guarantee German reparations, pay them directly, or simply 
cancel them. This French demand for American benevolence 
prompted 
that the 
Under Secretary of State Norman Davis to 
French "still have the idea that the United 
remark 
States 
is Santa Claus."186 The French were convinced that they 
were being swindled; the Americans established France's 
total debt at approximately three and a half billion 
dollars, >vhile she had borrowed roughly two billion dollars 
during the war and spent the majority of it on American 
products. The French had purchased another half-billion 
dollars worth of American supplies in · 1919 and the remaining 
one billion dollars was for post-war relief aid.187 The 
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French and Americans did not conclude an agreement on 
reparations until early 1926, with payment to be made in 
full over sixty-two years at an average interest rate of one 
and a half percent.188 The British had previously agreed to 
repay the American government a fixed sum of four billion 
six hundred million dollars, repayable over sixty-two years 
at an average rate three and a third percent.189 
The German reparations problem still was far from being 
solved. Germany 1 s cash payments had been fixed in gold 
marks; German currency, however, was paper marks, and the 
value of those paper marks had been declining steadily since 
the middle of 19 20. In order for the German government to 
raise the necessary amount of paper marks for reparations, 
it would have to increase domestic taxes at the same rate at 
which the mark was falling. Even if the government could 
acquire the necessary amount of paper marks, it ivould have 
had to convert these into gold or foreign currencies to 
transfer to the Allied powers. A sale of such a large 
quantity of paper marks on the foreign exchange market was 
bound to decrease the external value of the mark, thereby 
exacerbating the entire problem. The rapid decline of the 
paper mark 1 s value both inside and outside Germany made 
German reparations impossible by 1922.190 
The fall of the mark was due, in part, to a lack of 
confidence by financial speculators in any long-term future 
of a German economy with indefinite reparations hanging over 
its head. It was also due to the uncanny financial policies 
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of the German government. During the war, a large gap had 
formed between government income and expenditures, · which was 
filled by the issue of treasury bills. These bills were 
taken by banks and as such represented borrowed money but 
nearly half of them had been discounted (converted to paper 
money) by the Reichsbank. This income/expenditure gap had 
persisted after the war and, once again, it was covered by 
an increase in floating debt. 
collapse, it became extremely 
Once the mark began to 
difficult for the German 
government to raise enough domestic taxes to balance that 
widening gap.191 
Germany . was thrown into a currency crisis. By April 
1920, the mark had fallen from its normal value of twenty 
marks to the pound to two hundred and fifty to the pound. 
It held 
speculators 
its normal 
there until March 1921, supported by foreign 
who assumed that 
value. When, by 
the mark must some day resume 
the latter month, it became 
apparent that Germany would require large sums of foreign 
currency to meet her reparations schedule, the mark began to 
fall again; by November, its value had fallen to one 
thousand marks to the pound and by the summer of 1922 the 
mark fell at a catastrophic pace.192 
The German government declined to avail itself of the 
opportunity 
had opted 
afforded it from April 1920 to March 
neither to increase taxation nor did 
1921. It 
it reduce 
government spending in order to close the now-gigantic 
difference between income and expenditure. Reparations were 
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not crushing the German economy. Rather, the German 
government's persistent · refusal to make any serious attempt 
at balancing the budget allowed the financial crisis to 
worsen. It appeared as if Berlin was deliberately trying to 
destroy the value of the mark; the failure to implement the 
financial reforms demanded by the Allies reinforced the 
growing suspicion abroad that Germany had never earnestly 
considered paying the victors their due.193 This suspicion 
of German trickery was probably quite valid. Prompt German 
payment according to the reparations schedule dictated that 
Germany reduce domestic consumption and increase taxes. The 
tightening of the purse would allow Germany to export 
domestic goods, while reducing domestic demand for imports. 
Thus, Germany would be free to accumulate sufficient foreign 
exchange to discharge her reparation debts. But neither the 
German people nor the Weimar Republic were prepared to make 
any sacrifice, minimal as that might be. Moreover, what 
better way to promote the breakdown of a European financial 
system which had become centered on German reparations than 
to eliminate German financial solvency?194 
Germany had exhausted her capacity to make cash 
payments on anything. The mark was worthless to the rest of 
the world and, even if the German government had the 
wherewithal to pay, she had no means of purchasing foreign 
currencies.195 By December 19 21, Ber 1 in announced that it 
would be unable to pay its cash installment due in January 
1922. Temporarily, the Allies agreed to reduce German 
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obligations to thirty one million gold marks to be paid 
every ten days, subsequently reduced in March 19 2 2 to fifty 
million per month provided that the German government did 
not increase the floating debt and that it informed the · 
Reparations Commission of any plans to balance the German 
budget.196 
The British government called for a two years' 
moratorium on all cash payments by Germany, provoking bitter 
protest from the French government, ever-determined to make 
Germany pay and to avoid having to force the French people 
to bear the full costs of reconstruction and reparation.197 
On 12 July 1922, Germany asked that she be permitted to 
cease all cash payments for the rest of 1922, and all of 
1923 and 1924. The Allies refused in August, though they 
allowed Germany to defer the remainder of 1922 payments. On 
14 November, 
suspension of 
Berlin 
payments 
requested 
in kind 
a 
to 
three to 
the French 
four year 
devastated 
regions; these payments could be made without increasing the 
floating debt and France saw no reason for them to be cut 
off. This 
conflict: 
refused any 
unilaterally 
Germany; the 
brought the French and British into direct 
The militant French Premier Raymond Poincare 
more concessions and threatened to act 
in securing "productive 
British, whose overriding 
German financial stability, argued that 
guarantees" · from 
concern was now 
the need was to 
stabilize the mark, not ruin it by Allied interference with 
German industry.198 
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Productive guarantees proved to be too much of a 
temptation to a French government determined to enforce 
strict German obedience to the Treaty of Versailles. By the 
end of December 1922, Germany had failed by a small margin 
to fulfill its obligation of deliveries in kind of timber. 
French, Italian and Belgian 
Reparation Commission, against 
declared Germany in "voluntary 
representatives of the 
the vote of the British, 
default"; on 9 January 1923 
the same voting majority declared Germany in default over 
deliveries of coal. The Treaty allowed the Allies, "in case 
of voluntary default by Germany," to take "such measures as 
the respective governments may determine necessary."199 On 
11 January 1923, after an abortive attempt to secure British 
approval, French and 
troops marched into 
instability in the 
Belgian 
the Ruhr. 
years 
(and Italian technicians) 
The crisis of European 
immediately following the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles had now reached its 
apex. 
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V. FROM THE DARK HEART OF THE RUHR TO THE PALE LIGHT OF 
LOCARNO, 1923-1925. 
Immediately after the French and Belgian troops entered 
the Ruhr, the German government under Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno 
ordered the miners and railway workers in the region to 
withhold their cooperation. The French countered this policy 
of "passive resistance" by sending in a much larger contingent 
of troops, which sealed off the Ruhr from the rest of 
Germany. 200 Recalcitrant local officials and industrialists 
were either imprisoned or expelled while French, Belgian and 
Italian technicians extracted nearly everything they could 
from Germany's industrial heartland. A "mission interalliee 
de contr6le des usines et des mines" (MICUM) was established to 
secure coal from the German mines, levy taxes on coal 
deliveries to be made to production, arrange for timber 
France, and to establish customs 
of the occupied zone.201 For 
barriers to the east and west 
scored a victory through 
without British approval. 
secure German reparations. 
the moment, France had 
Ruhr her decision 
At long last, 
to occupy 
she had 
the 
begun to 
The 
against 
French coalition's decision to occupy the Ruhr 
British recommendations distinctly 
Franco-British relations. The British government 
strained 
adopted a 
policy of "surly neutrality," viewing the occupation as only 
marginally legal under the Treaty of Versailles and as an 
inappropriate method of securing German reparations. The 
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authorities in the British occupied zone refused to adhere to 
the decisions of the French-dominated High Commission.202 The 
Americans, too, were dissatisfied with France's unilateral 
decision to act without Allied support; on 8 January 1923, 
Secretary of State Hughes warned the French that if they sent 
troops into the Ruhr, America would proceed to withdraw the 
remainder of her occupation forces. When French and Belgian 
troops entered the Ruhr, she did just that.203 
The occupation had ruined Germany's financial sector and 
helped to bring on the most severe bout of hyperinflation the 
world had ever known. On the eve of the occupation, the mark 
had already fallen to thirty-five thousand to the pound. By 
the end of 1923, one hundred thirty-three printing offices 
equipped with one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three 
printing presses were turning out currency at top speed;204 
by November of that year, fifty trillion (50,000,000,000,000) 
marks could be obtained for the price of one British pound.205 
One astute German statesman pointed out that the annual profit 
of the Darmstadter Bank was now insufficient to purchase a 
single tramway ticket.206 
Once the hyperinflation was under way, the German 
government did little to try and stall it. The reckless 
government 
unemployed 
printed vast amounts of money 
laborers in the Ruhr, with the 
to subsidize the 
effect of pumping 
more and more worthless currency into the shattered German 
economy. The Weimar officials, after all, had no great desire 
to balance the books; the sounder the economy, the more the 
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government would be forced to pay the Allies. With the 
disappearance of the mark into an abyss, so went the Allies' 
hopes for German reparations. In the long-run, the German 
government's inability to deal with the skyrocketing inflation 
was worse for finances than had been the preposterous 
reparation sums. Germany's domestic economy lay in ruins, and 
was felt especially by the large middle-class which had lost 
nearly everything it had ever owned.207 
On 27 September 1923, after the complete collapse of the 
mark, the ruinous policy of passive resistance was abandoned 
by the new German government, led by Gustav Stresemann. Once 
the policy was abolished, the coal mines and railways of the 
Ruhr began to operate 
concerned profited. 
effectively and 
France, Belgium 
nearly every party 
and Italy collected 
reparations to the value of approximately nine hundred million 
marks.208 During the occupation, British exports of coal and 
pig-iron had soared due to the sealing off the Ruhr from 
Germany's continental customers. Germany profited as well; 
she had been able to discharge most of her domestic debt in 
the worthless currency 
truck-load.209 
that presses were printing by the 
Throughout the summer of 19 23, the French government 
under Poincare 
schedule of May 
evacuated only 
regular basis. 
insisted 
1921 and 
that Germany uphold the 
announced that the Ruhr 
payment 
would be 
after Germany began to make 
The British Foreign Office 
payments on a 
argued that the 
occupation was illegal and that reparations could be extracted 
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only under a plan agreed upon by all parties concerned. 
Poincare was furious with the British and fired back: 
Since the signature of the peace, England has 
always tried to seek a basis for conciliation 
on which Germany could negotiate as an equal 
with the allies .•. We are persuaded, on the 
other hand, that if Germany, so far from 
making the slightest effort to execute the 
treaty of peace, has only sought to evade 
obligations, it is because she has not yet 
been convinced of her defeat ... In fact, the 
allies have never gotten anything from 
Germany, except when, together, they have 
threatened to use force.210 
By the beginning of 1924, however, a severe financial crisis in 
France had persuaded Poincare to rethink his methods for German 
payment. The French government's refusal to increase domestic 
taxation, even after it realized that massive German 
reparations were not forthcoming, made the simultaneous 
reconstruction of the devastated regions, subsidization of 
social welfare programs, and servicing the growing foreign 
debt impossible.211 As a result, Poincare proposed that a 
committee of financial experts (composed of Allied and 
Associated Powers, implying that the Americans should be 
present) should be appointed to investigate Germany's capacity 
to pay. The Americans and British, anxious to reach a 
settlement and sensing France's grave concern for her failing 
economy, were thus enabled to impose a financial settlement of 
their own upon the reluctant government in Paris.212 
In January 1924, a team of financial experts, led by the 
American banker General Charles Dawes, met to consider how 
Germany's budget might be balanced and her currency 
stabilized. On 9 April, the committee presented the "Dawes 
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Plan" to the Allied Reparations Commission. It called for the 
creation of a new currency, the Reichsmark, to replace the 
older Rentenmark, which the Weimar government had established 
after the collapse of the mark at the end of 1923. The 
Reichsmark would be controlled by a Bank of Issue, a financial 
authority independent of the German government. Once a stable 
currency had been established, the Plan recommended that 
Germany pay to the Allies fifty million pounds per year; after 
the fifth year of financial stability, that figure would rise 
to one hundred twenty-five million per year.213 
Security for these payments was to be ensured by bonds of 
the state railways, German industrial enterprises, and the 
revenues from the customs taxes on alcohol, sugar and 
tobacco. To ensure that German reparations would not disturb 
the international monetary exchanges, the 
Germany make her payments in marks, with 
for the conversion of currencies to fall 
Plan proposed that 
the responsibility 
to the Allies. 
Further, to ensure that the Plan operated in the interests of 
both Germany and her creditors, the Reparations Commission was 
given the authority to appoint Allied commissioners to the 
board of the Bank of Issue, to the management of the railways, 
and an "Agent for Reparation Payments" was established to 
supervise the entire operation. For the Plan to be effected, 
the team called for the immediate evacuation of the Ruhr and a 
foreign loan of forty million pounds to be made to Germany to 
aid her in meeting the first payment.215 
The Plan was presented expressly as a whole from which no 
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clauses could be subtracted. On 17 April 1924, Germany 
accepted the principles of the Dawes Plan, followed by Great 
Britain, Belgi urn and Italy on the 25th. By then, the French 
economy was on the verge of collapse and creditors on Wall 
Street and in the City of London "suggested" that the French 
government relinquish its stringent demands on Germany and 
accept the Plan. American Secretary Hughes warned reluctant 
French politicians that " ... if you turn this down, America is 
through."216 Poincare accepted the Plan on 25 April. 
The Dawes Plan was submitted to an Allied conference held 
in London in August 1924 and was accepted without much 
difficulty. Germany was assured that never again would 
penal ties be imposed unless she began to default chronically 
on payments. In October, Germany received the loan assured 
her under the Plan; over half of the capital was supplied by 
New York investment houses. Great Britain supplied 
one-quarter and France, 
picked up the rest. 
Italy, Belgium, 
By the middle 
Switzerland and Sweden 
of November, the last 
troops were evacuated from the Ruhr and the Ruhr Crisis was 
brought to an end.217 
The Dawes Plan represented a fundamental modification to 
the reparations clauses of the Treaty which had plagued 
the peace in 1919. By European 
accepting 
affairs since the signing of 
the principles of the Plan, France relinquished her 
"right" to procure German reparations through force of arms. 
With the fall of the militant Poincare regime in May 1924 and 
the advent of the conciliatory government under Edouard 
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Her riot, France was ready to forego absolute adherence to the 
provisions of Versailles. Never would the unilateral 
for French reparation use of military force 
schemes. 218 The Plan 
be an 
appeared 
again 
option 
to have eliminated the 
financial issues which had strained British, French and German 
relations throughout the 
was assured that Germany 
market for her goods. 
first 
would 
France 
half of the 1920's. Britain 
remain an economically viable 
was guaranteed that the 
much-needed German reparations would begin to flow into her 
coffers on a regular basis. Germany was freed from the threat 
of French invasion every time she failed to comply with the 
financial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. W.i th the fall 
of Poincare, it appeared as if a new era of conciliatory 
relations between the Great Powers was about to begin. 
The Dawes Plan contained several grave flaws, however. 
Most significantly, there still had been no pronouncement 
on Germany's total indebtedness. In return for the . French 
government's acceptance 
to set a sum- there still 
of the Plan, the Allies had agreed not 
admit to 
outrageous 
the people · 
figures that 
was 
that 
no French 
Germany 
government willing to 
could never pay the 
might be demanded of her. As a 
result, the German exchequer, once again, was saddled with a 
mysterious debt. What the German government did know, 
however, was that the sounder its finances were, the more it 
was going to have to pay the Allied governments. The unknown 
reparations figure offered the government no incentives to 
curb its rash spending habits. Moreover, with the influx of 
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rnassi ve amounts of borrowed capital, the govern~ent had more 
to spend. The Plan also contained the fatal flaw of linking 
European financial stability to one country- the United 
States. So long as American "generosity" continued, Germany 
was enabled to pay the Allies; the Allies, in turn, were then 
able to repay their American debts. Should that flow of 
capital ever be dammed, however, 
itself in the same financial dire 
left.219 
Europe was going to 
straits that it had 
find 
just 
The Dawes Plan was not the panacea for the difficulties 
hindering the reestablishment of political harmony between 
Britain, France and Germany; for while the financial troubles 
between these three powers may have been solved, there 
remained the troublesome territorial and disarmament clauses 
of the Treaty of Versailles. Britain had succeeded in 
securing German financial stability, but French military 
preponderance ensured that a balance of power was still 
unattainable. France 1 s acceptance of the Dawes Plan by no 
means implied that she was prepared to forgive and forget. 
Realistically, the French government had been forced to accept 
the Plan; had it not done so, it faced not only financial 
insolvency but diplomatic isolation from the other powers 
ready to settle, once and for all, the reparations imbroglio. 
Nor did German adherence to the Dawes Plan mean that the 
vanquished state was prepared to accept its place in the new 
world order! The German 1 s desire for revision of the 
Versailles system remained, only now they had the wherewithal 
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to worl<: toward it. The free flow of American capital was to 
become a money-borrowing orgy, and the German High Command 
(with the tacit support of the Weimar government) utilized the 
capital to rebuild and restructure the armed forces. 
At the end of December 19 24, an Allied Conference of 
Ambassadors announced that the upcoming evacuation of one of 
the three occupied Rhineland 
would be postponed due to 
zones, stipulated by 
a report by the 
the Treaty, 
Inter-Allied 
Commissions which complained of German disregard for the 
disarmament clauses of Versailles. 220 Alarmed by the prospect 
of losing the new-found Allied benevolence, the German Foreign 
Minister Stresemann sent a note to the British government on 
20 January 1925 and to the French government on 9 February. 
In both notes, Stresemann proposed a security pact 
guaranteeing the frontiers between France, Germany 
as they had been established by the Treaty. 
and Belgium 
The shrewd 
statesman recognized that Great Britain would accept almost 
any settlement which eased Franco-German tensions in Western 
Europe. Moreover, Stresemann knew that the condition of the 
French economy, along with France 1 s fear of diplomatic 
isolation, would compel her to comply with the British desire 
to see a final accord reached.221 With a guarantee to 
France 1 s eastern frontiers, the Her riot government might be 
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convinced to cease the oppressive enforcement of the 
disarmament clauses of the Treaty. 222 France craved security 
in the form of Germany's acceptance of the borders established 
at Versailles and the recognition of the demilitarized status 
of the Rhineland. Germany wanted the Rhineland occupation 
forces evacuated 
relinquish their 
as soon as 
demands 
possible and for the Allies to 
for total German disarmament. 
Finally, Great Britain sought a restoration of the balance of 
power so that she 
continental affairs.223 
could 
With 
safely extricate herself from 
these goals in mind, Stresemann 
of Germany, Briand of France, Austen Chamberlain of Britain, 
and representatives of Belgi urn and Italy withdrew to a chalet 
in the Swiss resort town of Locarno in October 1925 to hammer 
out a settlement.224 
The Treaty of Locarno contained several guarantees 
established between the attending states. Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy and Belgi urn collectively guaranteed the western 
German frontier as well as the demilitarized status of the 
Rhineland. Germany 
Eupen-Malmedy and 
provisions.225 
established between 
accepted the 
reconciled 
There were 
Germany and 
loss 
itself 
also 
of Alsace-Lorraine and 
to the 
arbitration 
Rhineland 
treaties 
Belgium and between Germany 
and France; arbitration conventions were established between 
Germany and Poland and Germany and Czechoslovakia. Further, 
treaties of guarantee were reached between Germany 
and between Germany and France, stipulating 
and Belgium 
that the 
signatories would not go to war against one another except in 
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pursuit of a decision of the League of Nations or if the 
demilitarized status of the Rhineland was violated. Both 
Great Britain and Italy were to act as guarantors to the 
treaties, assisting Germany against Belgian or French attack 
and Belgium and France against German aggression.226 
The Final Protocol of the Locarno Convention stated that 
France had concluded treaties of guarantee with both Poland 
and Czechoslovakia. Germany, however, failed to recognize her 
eastern frontiers as established by the Treaty of Versailles, 
though she disavowed any intentions of altering them by 
force. Germany did conclude arbitration treaties with Poland 
and Czechoslovakia, with France guaranteeing the territorial 
integrity of her junior partners in Eastern Europe. Britain, 
while more than willing than to guarantee France 1 s eastern 
frontiers, failed to put her stamp on any of the guarantees in 
Eastern Europe227; we have already reviewed Britain 1 s 
hesitancy in that region of the world. Finally, Germany 
received several extremely important pledges from the Allies 
regarding the prompt evacuation of the northern zone of the 
Rhineland, the scaling down of the occupation forces in the 
rest of the region, and a reduction . on the size and authority 
of the Allied disarmament commission in Germany.228 
The Locarno agreements, like the Dawes Plan before them, 
contained several difficulties. The first arose from the 
Allies 1 willingness to reduce the size of their inspection 
teams. Since 
clandestinely, 
early 
had been 
1920, the 
rearming the 
German High Command, 
mi 1 i tary under the helm 
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of the Chief of Staff, von Seeckt. This man found nearly 
every loophole imaginable within the disarmament clauses of 
Versailles and utilized them to Germany's advantage. Further, 
in April 1922, the Germans and the Russians signed the Treaty 
of Rapallo, through which the two reestablished diplomatic 
relations and renounced their financial claims against one 
another. 
to the 
The Treaty had two 
Allies that the two 
(and both of whom had Europe 
Allies after the war) were 
effects; first, it served notice 
most powerful states in Eastern 
been treated so poorly by the 
preparing to work together to 
overcome their present difficulties. More importantly, 
however, the Russians allowed the German High Command to train 
troops and build offensive weapons deep \vi thin their borders. 
The French and British (mainly through Polish agents) knew a 
surprising amount about German rearmament within both 
Germany and Russia, but they could hardly agree what to do 
about it when they could never agree on anything else. The 
result of all this was that, by the time Locarno, the Germans 
had created a "great army in small"; thanks to the scaling 
down of the inspection teams, the German were freer than ever 
to reestablish their armed forces.229 
Another difficulty arising from the Locarno settlements 
was the attitude of both Great Britain and Germany toward the 
smaller states in Eastern Europe. Britain had never shown any 
strategic interest in the welfare of Poland and the Little 
Entente; her decision 
clear of the east 
to guarantee the west while 
implied a subsidiary status to 
steering 
Eastern 
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Europe. Concurrently, Germany's recognition of her frontie-rs 
with France and Belgium and her disavowal of her borders with 
Poland and Czechoslovakia implied that, in the future, she 
might look to the east for territorial expansion. Britain's 
guarantee to the Locarno settlements meant that she would not 
tolerate German expansionist desires in the west, but that she 
would mind it a little less in the east. The guarantee also 
had the bizarre effect of establishing Britain as a potential 
military adversary to France; should France act unilaterally 
against Germany, Britain was sworn to defend Germany, by force 
of arms if necessary.230 
With the conclusion of these settlements, and the 
subsequent admission 
1926, Europe 
(Churchill). 
appeared to 
had 
The 
have 
of Germany into the League of Nations in 
entered the "pale light of Locarno" 
Dawes Plan and the Treaty of Locarno 
settled the territorial, financial and 
disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which had 
confounded attempts to reestablish stability in Europe after 
the conclusion of the Great War. That sense of stability, 
however, was an illusion. For the moment, Britain, France and 
Germany had settled their difficulties, but at the expense of 
those smaller countries in Eastern Europe who were incapable 
of refusing the decisions of the Great Powers. Germany never 
resigned herself to the loss of both territories and citizens 
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to the countries surrounding 
guarantees with Poland and the 
their safety; if Great Britain 
the French would be forced to 
her. France's military 
Little Entente did not imply 
was unwilling to defend them, 
face Germany alone when it 
decided to reclaim its "stolen properties." By 1925 it did 
appear, however, that the vi tal interests of the three powers 
had been attained. The peaceful reintegration of Germany into 
the system of international machinery, accompanied by France's 
new-found willingness to ease up on Germany, assured the 
British that the balance of power would be reestablished. 
France seemingly achieved her long sought after security 
through German approval of the frontiers in Western Europe. 
the Allies to Finally, 
implement 
Germany succeeded in convincing 
less stringent policies regarding the provisions of 
Versailles, which allowed her to focus on domestic affairs. 
With three-quarters of a century between the present day 
and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, it is easy for us 
to examine what went "wrong" in European international affairs 
between 1919 and 1925. 
implemented nothing more 
the belligerents of the 
more destructive conflict 
We now know that the Treaty 
than a twenty years' truce between 
First World War, followed by an even 
in 1939. The clarity of hindsight 
allows us to examine all this with ease; the statesmen of the 
early 1920's were not afforded this blessing, however. To 
assign blame to particular individuals and states for the 
faults of the Treaty of Versailles and for the outbreak of a 
Second World War is too easy, and often incorrec :.. We did n o t 
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set out to find the answers to these nebulous questions. 
Rather, we sought to explain why Britain, France and Germany 
failed to reestablish stable political and financial relations 
after the Great War. Throughout the first half of the 1920's, 
policies which appeared to have these three powers pursued 
been completely incompatible 
to return to that sense of 
with one another. Britain hoped 
"Edwardian normalcy" which had 
existed during 
War. To do so, 
the years prior to the outbreak of the Great 
she required a stable continental balance of 
power and a German market capable of purchasing British 
manufactured goods. Concurrently, France's overriding concern 
was territorial security, which was threatened by the 
existence of a unified German state. France, therefore, 
sought not a balance, but her own hegemony to ensure that 
Germany 
Rhine. 
could never resume armed hostilities across the 
Part of the French government's drive for hegemony 
caused it to demand strict German adherence to the financial 
clauses of the Treaty; in doing so, however, it prevented 
Germany from fulfilling Britain's financial expectations and 
Britain and France at odds with one another. often placed 
Finally, the 
the German 
settlements of 1924 and 1925 had not extinguished 
desire to recapture lost glory. The Weimar 
Republic, the High Command, and a large number of German 
citizens sought nothing less than to rid themselves of the 
Versailles settlement and restore Germany 
position as a Great Power. 
to its rightful 
Realistically, the Dawes Plan and the Treaty of Locarno 
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did not reconcile these national pursuits; the settlements were 
illusory and superficial ointments for deep wounds. The Dawes 
Plan did reestablish European financial stability 1 but only 
while American capital provided Germany with the wherewithal 
to make reparations. The Crash of 1929 illustrated the 
fundamental weakness of a system which depended on one state 
for financial stability. Nor did these settlements erase the 
territorial and disarmament difficulties engendered by 
Versailles; the German desire for expansion simply shifted 
from west to east. French alliances in Eastern Europe meant 
that France was going to face Germany alone whenever the 
latter state was strong enough to go looking for living room 
in the east. Peace and stability were reestablished in Europe 
by 19251 but they were to be fleeting. Dawes and Locarno were 
weak supporters for an even weaker foundation of European 
order that was to come flying apart in 1939. 
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